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ABSTRACT
RICHARD K. MATTICK. Development of an Occupational Audit
System for OSHA's Proposed Bloodborne Pathogens Standard.
(Under the Direction of Dr. ALVIS G. TURNER)
OSHA's proposed bloodborne pathogen rule will be the
agency's first and most costly attempt at regulating
biological hazards, namely HIV and HBV, in the occupational
environment.  Lifetime risk of infection to healthcare
workers from HIV and HBV can be significantly reduced with
adherence to the OSHA standard.  In this study, an audit
system was developed to provide research and clinical
laboratories and production facilities with a means of
assessing compliance with the rule.  In addition, a fault
tree analysis added the ability to classify facilities on
the basis of exposure risk to bloodborne pathogens.
Database software offers the ability to store collected
audit information and disseminate risk management strategies
and remedial information to audited facilities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 1989, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) issued a proposed rule to regulate
workers' exposures to blood and body fluids potentially
contaminated with bloodborne pathogens.  The proposal, which
covers close to 5.7 million workers, aims to protect health¬
care workers and public service personnel against the
diseases associated with these agents, primarily the serious
liver disease associated with the hepatitis B virus (HBV)
and the often fatal acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, or
AIDS, caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).  The
proposed standard is the Agency's first effort at trying to
regulate a biological hazard rather than a physical or
chemical one.  OSHA held five public hearings (27), the last
one convening in San Francisco, January 9-17, 1990, and set
the closing date for the public comment period at May 21,
1990.  The comment period for the proposed rule was "the
largest substantive record in agency history" with 4,500
separate entries (29).  The final rule was expected to be
published one year later.  As of January 9, 1991, it was
announced that the rulemaking record closed December 10,
1990, and that the final rule was still due out sometime in
May of 1991.  Currently, however, the rule is still under
review with no mention as to when it will be issued.  As of
November, the proposed rule will be four years in the making
since its inception.
The objective of this report is to critically analyze
the proposed bloodborne standard.  It will track the
developmental history of the standard, define its scope and
impact on industry, and review some of the specific
bloodborne pathogens affecting the general population and
occupational workforce.  It will also discuss the risk
management techniques used to control bloodborne pathogens
in the workplace, including the development of an audit
system.  Lastly, this paper will identify the potential
advantages and disadvantages of this standard to industry
and the worker once promulgated.
CHAPTER II
BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Infectious Agent/Etioloqic Pathway/Clinical Manifestations
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), formerly
referred to as the human T-lymphotrophic virus type III
(HTLV-III) or lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV), was
discovered in 1983 and is the etiologic agent of acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).  It is a retrovirus,
containing RNA instead of DNA for its genetic code.  Two
types have been identified, type 1 (HIV-1) and type 2 (HIV-
2).  Both these viruses are serologically and geographically
relatively distinct, but have similar epidemiologic and
pathologic characteristics.  HIV attacks a subpopulation of
T-lymphocytes known as the T4 or CD4 cell, the white blood
cell that influences the function of many other cells in the
immune system, by multiplying within them, and eventually
destroying them.  The process of T-cell destruction leads to
immune system imbalance and dysfunction.  Without a properly
functioning immune system, the body becomes susceptible to
opportunistic infection and disease from organisms that
normally pose no or minimal threat to healthy humans with
normally functioning immune systems.  Generally, the
severity of the HIV-related illness is directly correlated
with the degree of immune system dysfunction.  The spectrum
of diseases range from totally asymptomatic infection to
full-blown immunodeficiency accompanied by opportunistic
infection and cancer (4,5,58).
Within several weeks to several months after infection
with HIV, many persons develop an acute, self limited, flu¬
like illness lasting for a week or two.  Evidence that such
symptoms occur is best ascertained by documented
occupational exposure.  Detectable antibodies
(seroconversion) to the virus usually occurs within 4 to 12
weeks after initial infection with the virus; occasionally
this period is prolonged.  The standard serologic tests for
antibody to HIV are the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) and the confirmatory Western Blot HIV antibody test
performed in succession (4,5).  Infected persons may be free
of clinical signs or symptoms of infection for many years;
the median length of time before symptoms appear is now
estimated to be in excess of 9 years (49).  Onset of
clinical illness is usually insidious with non-specific
symptoms such as lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes),
anorexia, chronic diarrhea, weight loss, fever and fatigue.
These symptoms along with HIV antibody confirmation are
referred to as AIDS related complex (ARC) or "symptomatic
HIV infection", but are not sufficient for a diagnosis of
AIDS (4).
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More than a dozen opportunistic infections and several
cancers are considered by the CDC to be specific indicators
of uderlying immunodeficiency and thus, if diagnosed by
standard histological and/or culture techniques, are used in
case definition of AIDS.  These opportunistic infections
include: Pneumocystis carnii pneumonia, which 60% of AIDS
patients have as their first manifestation of the disease,
chronic cryptosporidiosis, toxoplasmosis of the CNS,
esophageal or lower respiratory tract candidiasis,
disseminated or CNS cryptococcosis, disseminated atypical
mycobacteriosis, pulmonary, GI, CNS, or ocular
cytomegalovirus (CMV) infection, chronic ulcerative
mucocutaneous or disseminated herpes simplex infection, and
progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy.  The cancers
include Kaposi's sarcoma, primary B-cell lymphoma limited to
the brain and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.  Additional indicators
of AIDS are wasting syndrome, extrapulmonary tuberculosis
and varied neurologic  symptoms such as AIDS dementia or
sensory neuropathy (4).
The proportion of HIV-infected persons who will
ultimately develop AIDS is not precisely known although
cohort studies of HIV-infected adults carried out before
specific antiviral therapy was available indicated that
about 15-20% developed AIDS within 5 years, and about 50%
within 7-10 years.  Beyond 10 years, it was projected that
the vast majority of infected persons may develop AIDS
within another 5 to 10 years.  Without specific therapy, 80-
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90% of AIDS patients have died within 3-5 years after the
diagnosis of AIDS was made.  With modern day drug therapy
such as Zidovudine better known as AZT, these incubation
periods and time-to-death are thought to be extended by a
couple of years (4).
Transmission
The reservoir for the virus is found in man and is
spread almost entirely through direct contact with an
infected person's blood, blood products, semen, vaginal
secretions, and tissues.  While the virus on occasion has
been found in saliva, tears, urine, cerebrospinal fluid,
pleural fluid, amniotic fluid, and breast milk, transmission
after contact with these fluids, with the exception of
perinatal transmission to a mother's infant through breast
milk, has not been reported (4,11,37,47).  The major route
of transmission is sexual, both homosexual and heterosexual.
Other important routes of exposure are parenteral (entry
into the body other than through the GI tract) such as by
shared needles among drug abusers and accidental
percutaneous needlestick injuries or other contaminated
skin-penetrating objects; through blood transfusions of
infected blood or its components, and by contact of infected
body fluid with raucous membranes of the nose, mouth, and
eyes or with open wounds/sores (non-intact skin) (4,11,47).
The virus can cross mucous membranes but cannot cross the
skin barrier and is not transmitted by casual contact.
fecal-oral or airborne routes, or by contaminated food or
drinking water (13).  The infectious dose, or number of HIV
viral particles needed to cause infection in man is unknown,
although the number of viral particles found in
seroconverted blood ranges from 0-3,000/ml (55).
Epidemiology: General Population
AIDS was first recognized in New York and Los Angeles
in 1981 and was used to describe a disease complex of young,
seemingly healthy men with a severe cellular immune
deficiency (35).  From 1981 to mid 1990, over 130,000 AIDS
cases have been reported in the U.S (4).  (See Figure 1 for
reported cases by state)  That number is expected by the CDC
to triple to 365,000 cases by the end of 1992 (47).  As of
July 1990, the majority of U.S. AIDS cases (86%) were
homosexual or bisexual men (57%), IV drug users (23%), and
those who were homosexual and used IV drugs (6%). The
remainder of the cases were hemophiliacs (1%), heterosexual
contacts of infected partners (6%), transfusion recipients
(2%), children born to infected mothers (1%), and
undetermined/other (4%) (11,47).  (See Figure 2)  Ninety -
one percent of these cases are male and approximately that
same percentage are between 20-49 years of age (4,47).  It
is estimated that currently between 1.0-1.5 million
Americans have been infected with the HIV virus, and 6 to 8
million world-wide (4,41).
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TIZ 1
ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) - Reported adult/adolescent cases, by exposure category. United
StatM, 1989
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'Includes patients under investigation; patients who died, were lost to follow-uo. or refused interview: and patients whose mode
of exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) remains undetermined after investigation.
Source: Centers for Disease (Control, tm^^:  Summary Report, 1990
FIG 2
ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) - Cases per 100.000 population, reported to CDC by state,
UnKed States, 1989.
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Epidemiology: Health-Care Workers
Several prospective epidemiologic studies show that
needlestick injuries are the leading cause of occupational
HIV exposure in the health-care setting.  In 1988, an
updated review of the CDC Cooperative Needlestick Study, an
ongoing, nationwide prospective survey, found that 89% of
all HIV exposures resulted from percutaneuos inoculation,
while 6.5% resulted from contamination of open wounds, and
4.7% from contamination of mucous membranes (41).  Several
prospective surveillance studies, in addition to the CDC
study, have been initiated to estimate the risk of infection
following an exposure that meets the following criteria: (1)
documented exposure to HIV; (2) no other established risk
factors; (3) negative pre-exposure HIV serology; and (4)
positive post-exposure HIV serology.  Through November 1989,
of the more than 2,000 exposed health-care workers who
enrolled in 9 different prospective surveys, 8 workers had
been found to have occupationally acquired HIV infection
(41,43).  Of the 8 infected workers, 7 were exposed through
the percutaneous route and the eighth case through blood
contact with non-intact skin.  The risk of HIV infection
from an occupational exposure, as calculated by the review
of these studies, was less then .5%, or more specifically
.36% or 3.6 per 1000 exposures (41).  This coincides with
the approximate .5 % risk estimated by the CDC (55).  In
addition to these studies, there have been an additional 19
case reports of HIV-infected health-care workers in the
scientific literature (13 with documented seroconversion and
6 without documented seroconversion).
Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) '
Infectious Agent/Etioloqic Pathway/Clinical Manifestations
The terra hepatitis means inflammation of the liver.
One of the causes of hepatitis besides bacteria, toxins,
drugs, and excess alcohol intake is by the hepatitis B virus
(HBV).  HBV is a double-stranded DNA virus which attacks and
replicates in liver cells.  There have been 3 HBV antigens
identified: a nucleocapsid core (HBcAg), surrounded by an
outer lipoprotein coat (HBsAg), and a third soluble antigen
and a subset of the core antigen without cross reactivity,
the e antigen (HBeAg).  Antibodies are made specific to
these antigens and are referred to as anti-HBc, anti-HBs,
and anti-HBe (4).  Diagnosis of infection is usually
confirmed by demonstration of HBsAg.  HBV infection may also
be confirmed by the presence of HBV viral DNA in the serum
or the demonstration of recent antibody development to core
and/or surface antigens (anti-HBc and anti-HBs) (4).  In
combination with HBsAg, the detection of HBeAg is associated
with relatively high infactivity (acute infection);
conversely, presence of anti-HBe correlates with a relative
lack of infectivity.  The presence of HBeAg at the time of
delivery indicates a very high risk of infection in a
newborn infant.  Commercial kits including ELISA and
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radioimmunoassy (RIA) are available for detection of all
markers except HBcAg (58).
HBsAg can be detected in the serum from several weeks
before onset of symptoms to days, weeks or months after
onset; it is persistent in chronic infections.  Anti-HBc
appears at the onset of illness and persists indefinitely.
IgM Class anti-HBc is present in high concentration (high
titer) during acute infection and usually disappears within
6 months (4).
Approximately 50% of the patients that are infected
with HBV have symptoms of some type; the rest are
subclinical or asymptomatic (36).  Usual incubation period
is about 45 days (36).  Clinical symptoms may start between
one week to six months after exposure.  These symptoms are
flu-like and include fatigue, fever, lose of appetite,
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, rash, and muscle
and joint aches.  Approximately 25% of individuals, however,
will suffer more acute symptoms with the involvement of the
liver, and develop jaundice and dark urine.  One-half to two
percent of patients with severe liver involvement, called
fulminant liver disease, will die (36).
Although most infected individuals recover with no serious
complications, approximately 10% of infected adults do not
develop resistance to the virus and develop what is known as
chronic hepatitis.  These individuals become carriers of the
virus and can actively transmit it.  Usually chronic
hepatitis persists for more then 4 to 6 months, sometimes as
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long as a lifetime.  During the chronic state, the carrier
may be asymptomatic or continue to have symptoms.  Other
complications include "chronic active" hepatitis which has
the potential to progress to cirrhosis of the liver and a
much increased risk of developing liver cancer.  About 25%
of the carriers, whether they have symptoms or not,
eventually will develop liver cancer (36).  The relative
risk of liver cancer for active carriers is 273 times
greater than for non-carriers (1).
Transmission
HBsAg has been found in virtually all body secretions
and excretions; however, only blood and serum derived
fluids, saliva, semen, and vaginal fluids have been shown to
be infectious (4).  The virus is found in the highest
concentrations in the blood, where it may reach levels of
1 X 10  viral particles per milliliter (36).  Transmission
occurs by percutaneous (intravenous, intramuscular,
subcutaneous or intradermal) and mucous membrane exposure to
infective body fluids, as may occur in needlestick
accidents, perinatal exposure, transfusions, contaminated
needle sharing among IV drug users, tattooing, earpiercing,
acupuncture, and by sexual exposure, both heterosexual and
homosexual.  Personal hygiene items such as razors and
toothbrushes have been implicated as occasional transmitters
of HBV (4).  The virus is not transmitted by casual contact,
touching or shaking hands, eating food prepared by an
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infected person or by contact with inanimate objects, such
as toilet seats, or telephones.  All stages of the disease,
including the pre-clinical state (many weeks before symptoms
are seen), the clinical period, as well as the chronic
carrier state are considered infectious and communicable
periods.
In the health-care occupations, the most important
sources of transmission are accidental needle-sticks and
infected fluid contact with mucous membranes of the eyes and
mouth, and non-intact skin such as cuts, skin lesions and
dermatitis (55).  The only reservoir in nature is man,
although chimpanzees are susceptible to infection (4).
Despite the similarities in the modes of transmission, the
risk of HBV infection in health-care settings far exceeds
that for HIV infection.  This is thought to occur due to the
number of infectious particles per milliliter of blood in
infected persons, up to 8 logs for HBV compared with 3 logs
for HIV, as well as the infectious dose (number of viral
particles needed to cause infection), an average of only 10
particles intravenously for HBV (36,55).  For example, it
has been estimated that the risk of acquiring HBV infection
following a puncture with a contaminated needle ranges from
6% to 30% - far in excess of the risk of HIV infection under
similar circumstances (<1%) (11,55).
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Epidemiology; General Population and Health-Care Occupations
Two to nine-tenths of a percent of the adult population
in the United States are carriers of HBV (HBsAg), and 5%
have anti-HBs.  In Asia the antigen carrier rate may be as
high as 10-15% (4).  HBV infection is common in high risk
groups where exposure to blood and body fluids is high.
This includes parenteral drug abusers, heterosexuals with
multiple partners, homosexual men, clients and staff in
institutions for the retarded, and health-care and public
safety occupations.  The CDC has estimated the total number
of HBV infections to be 300,000 in the U.S. each year,
leading to 15,000 hospitalizations, 375 deaths due to
fulminant hepatitis, 6,000 deaths due to hepatitis related
cirrhosis, and 1,200 deaths due to hepatitis-related primary
liver cancer (11). (See Figure 3 for reported cases by
state)  CDC also believes that as many as 18,000 health-care
workers per year may be infected by HBV, approximately
12,000 of these cases through occupational exposure.  The
Hepatitis Branch of the CDC has further estimated that
between 500-600 health-care workers are hospitalized
annually due to acute occupational infection and illness
with over 200 deaths (12-15 due to fulminant hepatitis, 170-
200 from cirrhosis, and 40-50 from liver cancer) (11).
Studies have also shown that 10% to 30% of health-care
workers have demonstrated past or present hepatitis B
15,
FIG 3
HEPATITIS B - Reported cases, per 100,000 population. United States, 1989
uam
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^
Source: Centers for Disease Control, MMMi^: Summary Report, 1990
Table 1 Percentage of Health-Care Workers Demonstrating
Previous HBV Infection When Screened
What is my risk of acquiring hepatitis?
Health care professionals, especially those who are
exposed to or handle blood frequently, are at
significantly greater risk of contracting hepatitis B
than the general population. The following chart
indicates the percentage of various health care
workers who demonstrate previous hepatitis B
infection when screened for serological markers of
the disease:
Emergency Room
Nurses^ 30%
Surgeons^ 28%
Dialysis PersonneP 27%
Pathologists^ 27%
Blood Bank Workers^ 26%
Laboratory
Technicians^ 24%
Intravenous Teams^ 22%
Oral Surgeons' 21%
Pediatricians' 21%
Internal Medicine
Practitioners'
Anesthesiologists'
Oncology StafP
Obstetricians/
Gynecologists'
Family Practitioners'
Dentists'
18%
17%
17%
16%
16%
14%
Intensive Care Nurses^ 10%
Hospital Workers with
no patient contact' 4%
Source:    Reference i¥1, pp. 1-2
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infection when screened for serologic markers of the
disease (1).  (See Table 1)
Other Bloodborne Pathogens
There are many other pathogens carried in the blood and
body fluids that could cause potential infection to those
who come in contact with them.  While many of these agents
are not common in the U.S. or perhaps quite as infectious or
devastating as HBV and HIV, they can cause a myriad of
disease, some quite serious, and are included under the
scope and application of the proposed blood-borne pathogen
rule as "pathogenic microorganisms that are present in human
blood and can cause disease in humans (58)." A few of the
more significant agents, where occupational infection is a
potential or documented risk, will be discussed.
Hepatitis C (HCV)
Although there is evidence for several types of agents,
a candidate virus with a RNA genome has been detected and
suggested as the major HCV virus.  It is estimated that HCV
viruses cause between 15-35% of cominunity-acquired acute
hepatitis cases in the U.S. (58).  The principal mode of
transmission is bloodborne.  Major risk groups are IV drug
users, transfusion recipients and dialysis patients.
Health-care workers who come in frequent contact with blood
and household or sexual contact with infected persons have
also been documented to be at risk, although the extent to
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which these modes of transmission are important has not yet
been well defined.  It is known, however, that the number of
virus present in the blood of infected persons is much lower
than HBV and the relative infactivity is 100 to 100,000 fold
lower (58).  This suggests a lower risk of infection to
health-care workers, whose contact with blood, relative to
the defined high risk group, is small.  HCV is the most
common post-transfusion hepatitis in the U.S., accounting
for approximately 90% of this disease (4).  HCV viruses
cause both acute and chronic hepatitis: 40-60% of infections
lead to development of the chronic state, with potential for
progression to cirrhosis and lifetime infectivity (58).  A
serologic test for antibodies to HCV (anti-HCV) has just
been developed, however, current diagnosis depends on the
exclusion of Hepatitis A, B, D, and other causes of liver
damage.  Currently there is no available vaccine, and the
value of immune globulin for post-exposure prophylaxis is
undetermined.
Cytomegalovirus (CMV)
CMV is a herpesvirus that affects most persons at some
point in their lives.  It rarely produces symptomatic
disease in normal children and adults, although in
immunocompromised hosts and infants, it acts as an
opportunistic pathogen and causes serious illness and death
involving the liver, spleen and central nervous system (13).
It is usually a good indicator of clinically diagnosed AIDS.
"2^!ff-r'
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The virus persists in a latent form after a primary
infection, and reactivation may occur years later,
especially during an immunocompromised state.  CMV is
excreted in urine, saliva, semen, cervical secretions,
breast milk, and to a lesser degree associated with the
leukocytes in the blood.  Transmission occurs most commonly
by mucosal contact with the above fluids, usually through
sexual contact.  Transmission by blood transfusions can also
occur; however, since the virus is found in such low
concentration in the blood, infection is more likely to
occur after multiple transfusions.  There have been no
documented reports of CMV transmission via blood in the
occupational setting.  The fetus may be infected in utero
from a primary or reactivated maternal infection.  Postnatal
infection occurs more commonly in infants of mothers who are
actively shedding the virus in their cervical secretions
during birth.  Intrauterine infection of the infant is
thought to occur in .4% to 2.3% of all live births (58).
The virus can also be transmitted to the infant through the
breast milk.  Although most neonatal infections are
asymptomatic at birth, 10% of these infections display some
neurosensory disorder.  Of the 5-10% of those born who are
symptomatic, the most severely affected are those with
cytomegalic inclusion disease (CID) manifested by
hepatosplenoraegaly, jaundice, petechial rash,
chorioretinitis, cerebral calcifications, and microcephaly
(58).  Death may occur in-utero or neonatal. Survivors may
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exhibit mental retardation, motor disabilities, hearing
loss, and evidence of chronic liver disease.  Similar
symptoms of hepatitis retinitus, and pnemonitis can be seen
in immunocompromised individuals.  Infection acquired later
in life is usually inapparant, but may produce similar
symptoms to infectious mononucleosis.  Although the risk of
occupational infection would be low, there is some potential
threat to pregnant and immunocompromised health-care
workers.
Syphilis
Syphilis is caused by an infection with Treponema
pallidum, a spirochete, and is a sexually transmitted
disease whose incidence is increasing in the U.S.; 14.6
cases per 100,000 in 1987, is the highest rate since 1950
(58).  Syphilis is characterized by three stages, primary,
secondary, and tertiary with a latency period in between the
stages.  The primary stage is characterized by the eruption
of a chancre usually in the genital area; the secondary by
rash involving the palm and soles, fever, and secondary
eruptions; and the tertiary stage, with high morbidity and
mortality, with involvement of the skin and rubbery tumors
called gummas, the cardiovascular system, with lesions on
the aorta, and the central nervous system with an acute
meningitis.  Syphilis is most readily transmitted during the
primary and secondary stages, although transmission has
occurred throughout the course of the illness.  Syphilis is
:• -•^,^f^^^^^:f^^^"
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primarily transmitted by direct contact with exudates from
lesions; sexually, through contact with the infectious body
fluids and secretions (saliva, semen, blood, and vaginal
discharges); and in utero.  Transmission has also been
documented through blood transfusion, tattooing instruments,
and an occupational needlestick with blood from the early
stages of the disease (58).  Transmission rarely occurs
through kissing.  Treatment is very effective, especially in
the early stages, with antibiotics.
CHAPTER III
REGULATION OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
Before the announcement by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) in July of 1987 that the Agency
would adopt a permanent rule to protect health-care workers
from bloodborne diseases, there was no regulation by the
government of biological agents, of any type, in the
workplace (15).  At best, there was a myriad of guidelines,
publications, and reference manuals published over the years
that covered every aspect of work with biological agents.
These included everything from specific safety issues and
the etiologic agents associated with activities such as
animal handling, recombinant deoxyribose nucleic acid (rDNA)
research, oncology research, HIV/HBV prevention to guidance
in biological safety, laboratory safety and technique,
quality control and safety management, disinfection and
sterilization, facilities and equipment and
packaging/transport of etiologic specimens (3).  As R.M.
Pike reported in his 1979 review. Laboratory-associated
Infections: Incidence, Fatalities, Causes, and Prevention,
"the knowledge, the techniques, and the equipment to prevent
most laboratory infections are available (52)."  There was
not, however, at this time, any single code of practice,
standards, guidelines, or other publication that provided a
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detailed summary of the many safety issues and risk
management strategies associated with biological agents and
their use in the workplace.
This changed in the 1980's with the publication of two
comprehensive references.  The first of these, Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL),
published by the CDC and National Institute of Health (NIH)
branches of the Public Health Service, categorized
biohazardous agents into four classes or levels based on
their risk as an occupational hazard (56).  This concept was
originally presented in a 1969 publication, Classification
of Etioloqic Agents on the Basis of Hazard, which served as
a general reference for some laboratories utilizing
infectious agents and as the basic format for BMBL (56).
BMBL, however, is a much more comprehensive guide, providing
"specific descriptions of combinations of microbiological
practices, laboratory facilities and safety equipment, and
recommendations for use in four categories or biosafety
levels of laboratory operation with selected infectious
agents of man (56)."
The second publication, prepared by the American
Industrial Hygiene Association Biohazards Committee in 1985,
was titled the Biohazards Reference Manual.  It too
collected a lot of the loose and current information on
biological hazards but it was much more comprehensive than
BMBL, covering such issues as control methods, and
decontamination and disposal issues in much more detail as
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well as addressing newer issues such as allergies, current
bioaerosol sampling methodologies and eguipment and
immunoprophylaxis. (3)
While both of these references made noble attempts at
organizing biological safety issues and were (and still are)
significant sources of information for safety professionals,
no need was seen by the federal government to regulate the
workplace and officially safeguard the individuals working
with biological agents.  It was not until the increase in
the incidence of HIV and HBV in the general population,
along with the petitioning of several unions, that OSHA felt
the need to promulgate a standard to protect health-care
workers against these bloodborne diseases.  Currently OSHA
Instruction CPL 2-2.44B, issued February 27, 1990 which
revised OSHA Instruction 2-2.44A of August 15,1988,
regulates blood-borne pathogens in the workplace until the
proposed regulation, that was specifically designed to
reduce occupational exposure to these viruses, is
promulgated.  The directive basically relies on updated CDC
guidelines for HBV and HIV for reflecting an appropriate and
widely recognized and accepted standard of protection to be
followed by health-care employers in carrying out their
responsibilities under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSH Act) of 1970.  Its purpose is to provide uniform
inspection procedures and guidelines to be followed when
conducting inspections of health-care facilities and issuing
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citations (51).  Citations can be issued for regulations
that already exist under the OSH Act.  These include:
- 29 CFR 1910.132; personal protective equipment
- 29 CFR 1910.22 (a)(1) and (a)(2); general
housekeeping requirements
- 29 CFR 1910.141 (a)(94)(i) and (ii); waste disposal
provisions of the sanitation standard
- 29 CFR 1910.145 (f); specifications for accident
prevention signs and tags
- Section 5(a)(1) and Executive Order 12196, Section 1-
201(a); OSHA's General Duty Clause (51).
CHAPTER IV
PROPOSED REGULATION OF BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS
History of the Proposed Blood-Borne Pathogens Standard
The official involvement of OSHA in recognizing
bloodborne pathogens as an occupational hazard began with
the release of hepatitis B guidelines for health-care
workers in November 1983.  The guidelines, set forth in OSHA
Instruction CPL 2-2.36, were disseminated to health care
professionals by the Agency's regional and area offices as
part of OSHA's outreach program.  The recommendations were
largely drawn from guidelines prepared by the CDC, and
included a description of the disease, proper work practices
and personal protection, and the recommended use of
hepatitis B immune globulin and the hepatitis B vaccine
(13).  This was OSHA's only official recognition of
biological hazards in the workplace.  On September 19, 1986,
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) petitioned OSHA for an emergency
temporary standard (ETS) covering infectious bloodborne
diseases, including the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
and the hepatitis B virus (HBV), under section 6(C) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (10).  They maintained
that current guidelines, including those issued by the CDC,
-'f^^-'=^?fS^^^^P?V-'
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the American Hospital Association, the American Occupational
Medical Association, and the Department of Health and Human
Services for reducing occupational exposure to HIV, were not
fully or rigorously implemented in many health-care settings
and that "OSHA has completely neglected establishing legal
remedies to force health care employers to comply with
commonly accepted infectious disease precautions (10)."  The
Union further reasoned that the health care industry, the
industry most at risk of significant exposures to infectious
bloodborne diseases, is the largest and fastest growing
industry in the United States.  Besides requesting an ETS,
the petitioners asked OSHA to require employers to provide
the HBV vaccine at no cost to employees at high risk for HBV
infection and that the Hazard Communication Standard be
amended to require a training program for employees exposed
to infectious diseases.  Just three days later, on September
22, three AFL-CIO unions. Service Employees International
Union (SEIU), National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees (NUHHCE) and RWDSU Local 1199-Drug, Hospital, and
Healthcare Union also petitioned OSHA to promulgate a
standard to protect health-care employees from the hazard
posed by HBV (9).  They requested that the standard contain
all of the provisions in OSHA's 1983 guidelines with an
emphasis on making workers aware of the benefits of the HBV
vaccine.  In addition, they too wanted OSHA to issue an
immediate directive stating that employers must provide the
HBV vaccine free of charge to high risk employees.
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On July 23, 1987, after reviewing these petitions and
available data, OSHA denied the request for an emergency
temporary standard, but did announce that the Agency would
develop a permanent rule to protect the Nation's health-care
workers from exposure to bloodborne pathogens (15).  An
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) was published
four months later on November 27, 1987, requesting
information and comments on the health effects,
technological and economic feasibility, and other relevant
provisions that should be considered for inclusion in the
standard.  Interested parties had until January 26, 1988 to
submit such information (13).
Approximately one year and two months later, a draft
copy of the proposed bloodborne standard was made available
for discussion by Secretary of Labor Ann McLaughin to the
attendes at the January 8-10, 1989 conference, "AIDS:
Frontline Healthcare" in Washington D.C.  OSHA had planned
to publish it's proposed rule in December 1988, but the
Office of Management and Budget had yet to approve it (18).
Finally, on Tuesday May 30, 1989, the full text of the
proposed bloodborne pathogen regulations were printed in the
Federal Register, vol. 54, No. 102.  The new regulations
proposed to amend Part 1910 of Title 29 of the Code of
Federal Regulations with its addition as Section 1910.1030
(58).  (See Appendix A)  OSHA was hoping after a 90 day
public comment period, to publish a final rule within one
year (18).  The final rule has still not been issued.
28
Impact of Proposed Bloodborne Standard on Industry
When the proposed bloodborne standard is promulgated,
its impact will affect a large number of occupations.
Paragraph (a) of the proposed regulation, establishes the
scope of section 1910.1030 to apply to "all occupational
exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials
as defined by paragraph (b) of this section."  Paragraph (b)
continues by defining occupational exposure as "reasonably
anticipated skin, eye, mucous membrane, or parenteral
contact with blood or other potentially infectious materials
that may result from the performance of an employee's
duties. This definition excludes incidental exposures that
may take place on the job, and that are neither reasonably
nor routinely expected and that the worker is not required
to incur in the normal course of employment."  Other
potentially infectious materials is further defined to mean:
"(1) The following body fluids: semen, vaginal secretions,
cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid,
pericardial fluid, peritoneal fluid, amniotic fluid saliva
in dental procedures, and any body fluid that is visibly
contaminated with blood.
(2) Any unfixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin)
from a human (living or dead) and
(3) HIV or HBV containing cell or tissue cultures, organ
cultures, and culture medium or other solutions; and blood,
organs or other tissues from experimental animals infected
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with HIV or HBV (58)."
The impact of the proposed regulations will be felt the
hardest in the health-care industries and the emergency
medical services where an approximate 5.7 million workers at
620,000 sites have frequent contact with blood, body fluids,
and tissues (18,58).  This includes such professions as
nurses, physicians, dentists and other dental workers,
emergency room personnel, paramedics, emergency medical
technicians, advanced life support personnel, diagnostic and
research laboratory personnel, blood-bank personnel,
phlebotoraists, dialysis personnel, medical examiners,
morticians, institutional facility personnel, and other
workers such as housekeepers and laundry workers in health
care facilities.  Other occupations that can be interpreted
to fall with the scope of the proposed regulations are the
Public Safety Services which would include firefighters,
law-enforcement officers and correctional-facility workers
(13,55,58).  (See Table 2)
The proposed bloodborne pathogen standard will also be,
by far, OSHA's most expensive standard to implement.  The
costs of first year compliance are estimated to be about
$800 million, with hospitals having the highest annual
compliance costs of $33,035 per facility, funeral
establishments the lowest at $141, and the average being
$1,379 (18,58).  By comparison, OSHA's next most expensive1
regulation is the hazard communication standard which had a
$500 to $600 million implementation cost.  Usually most OSHA
?!!R?s.V--^---^.-r-'-
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standards carry first year costs of approximately $100
million (18).
CHAPTER V
MANAGEMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL RISK TO BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS
Risk, as defined in the environmental sciences, is the
probability of an adverse effect or event happening that
presents some possibility of harm to human health, the
ecology, the economic system, or the quality of human life.
Thus, risk management is the process by which this risk is
reduced (53).  In the specific environment of the workplace,
risks take on many forms:  there are physical risks such as
those posed by machinery and moving parts, environmental
conditions such as slippery floors, dangerous stairs, and
there are other physical forms such as heat, cold,
radiation, and noise;  there are chemical risks posed by the
various compounds and solvents utilized in the workplace;
and there are biological risks, risks posed by contact with
potentially infectious and disease causing agents such as
bacteria, viruses, fungi, and protozoans.  Collectively,
these risks can be identified as occupational; risks
encountered by the worker in the occupational setting.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) role, as defined in the Occupational and Safety
Health Act of 1970, is to manage the risks found in the
workplace by adopting regulations and providing guidelines
for various industries to follow.  These regulations are no
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more than lists of risk control methods, procedures, and
programs designed to eliminate or minimize hazardous working
conditions.  Historically, OSHA has managed the risk posed
by physical and chemical hazards in the workplace.  However,
with the advent of the proposed bloodborne pathogen
regulations, OSHA has made a determination that certain
employees face a significant health risk as the result of
occupational exposure to blood and other potentially
infectious materials because they may contain bloodborne
pathogens, including HBV, which causes a serious liver
disease, and HIV, which causes AIDS (58).  These employees
include health-care and public service occupations.
Employees incur risk each time they are exposed to
bloodborne pathogens; any one exposure incident may result
in infection and subsequent illness.  Since it is possible
to become infected from a single exposure, incidents should
be prevented whenever possible.  It is therefore the goal of
the proposed standard to reduce significant risk by
minimizing or eliminating exposure to blood or other
infectious materials.  This is accomplished through a
general infection control plan which is developed to
minimize the risk of patient acquisition of infection
through exposure incidents from contact with contaminated
devices, objects or surfaces, or transmission of an
infectious agent from health-care workers to patients (55).
It consists of three main parts:
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1. Identification of tasks or procedures that involve
occupational exposure to blood and other potentially
infectious materials.  This is usually broken down further
into three categories; category I, those with actual blood
exposure, category II, those tasks which, by themselves,
entail no blood exposure, though the individual assigned to
the task may be called upon to perform an unplanned category
I task, and category III, those with no blood exposure (11).
2. Identification and documentation of the actual
positions whose duties include the tasks (categories)
identified above without taking into account any protective
measures, such as personal protective equipment.
3. It must state when and how it will implement
protection and prevention to the positions defined in number
2.  This is usually accomplished using a combination of
engineering controls, work-practice controls, personal
protective clothing and equipment, containment and disposal,
training, safety inspection and audits, labelling and signs,
medical follow-up of exposure incidents, and vaccinations.
The risks are defined in parts 1 and 2 of the infection
control plan.  Part 3 identifies risk management strategies.
Risk Management Strategies
Engineering Controls
It is generally recognized among safety professionals,
especially industrial hygienists, that protection of the
35,
employee is most effectively attained by elimination or
minimization of the hazard at its source, i.e., engineering
controls (50).  Engineering controls do not rely on the
uncertainties and infallibility of human behavior and
therefore have always been preferred when feasible.
Examples of engineering controls that would protect
employees from exposure to bloodborne pathogens include
sharps disposal containers, biological safety cabinets, or
other types of vented enclosures, splashguards, needle-
recapping devices, or self-sheathing needles, which prevent
hand contact with the needle at all times (6,56).  These
controls embody the principles of process or eguipment
redesign, process or equipment enclosure, and employee
isolation (58).  An example of how engineering controls can
work is nicely portrayed in Vanderbilt University Medical
Center's laboratory liaison services study of two phlebotomy
devices designed to reduce needlestick injuries in
phlebotomy (6). (see Figure 4)
Work Practice Controls
Work practice controls reduce the likelihood of
exposure through alteration of the manner in which a task is
performed.  Unlike engineering controls, the protection they
provide is based upon employer and employee behavior,
however, like engineering controls, work practice controls
act on the source of the hazard.  In many instances the two
methodologies are reliant on one another for protection as
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FIG 4 Preventable Needlestick Injury Rate Reduction with Safety Devices
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it is often necessary to employ work practice controls to
assure effective operation of engineering controls, and
better employee protection.  Examples of work practice
controls that would protect employees from exposure to
bloodborne pathogens include no re-capping of contaminated
needles, no drinking, smoking, putting on cosmetics or
putting in contact lenses while in the laboratory, hand
washing, spill cleanup, using techniques that minimize
aerosolization of potentially infectious materials, working
with known biohazards in a biosafety cabinet, and wearing
personal protection correctly, (see biological safety audit
checklist. Appendix A)  However, one of the most important
work practices pertaining to bloodborne pathogens is the
implementation of "universal precautions" as recommended by
the CDC.  "Universal precautions" require employees to
assume that all blood and other body fluids are infectious
for HIV, HBV, and other bloodborne pathogens, and handle
them accordingly (37).  Quite often, training is an
effective means of teaching and learning good work
practices.  However, it takes inherent concentration and
consistency of practice on the employees part to make work
practices operative.
Personal Protective Equipment and Clothing
There are situations where neither engineering controls
nor work practice controls are feasible and thus employee
protection must be achieved through the use of personal
-"P^SS^fB^^PP*^^
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protective eguipment.  Personal protective equipment ranges
from gloves, protective shoe coverings, gowns, smocks, and
laboratory coats, to protective eyewear, and face shields.
In order for them to be effective, the following conditions
must be met.  First, the employee must be trained to use the
equipment properly.  Secondly, the equipment must be used
each time the task is performed and must be appropriate for
the task and fit properly.  Lastly, it must be free of
physical flaws that could compromise protection.  Personal
protection, like work practice controls, again relies on the
behavior and attitude of the employee.  An employer can
provide the equipment and training but cannot completely
ensure that the employee is meeting the above prescribed
conditions.  Also, in many cases, employees must exercise
their professional judgment as to whether a situation
dictates the use of personal protective equipment,
especially when other engineering controls and work
practices are available, or in cases of life and death
emergencies as encountered by many public service personnel.
Containment and Disposal
Waste disposal and containment are an unlikely but
possible source of occupational exposure to potentially
infectious materials and therefore need to be considered.
The disposal of broken contaminated glass and needles pose
the greatest risk since they lend themselves to auto-
inoculation.  Also of concern would be the leakage of
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infectious materials into work areas from a containment
device or onto the outside of a containment device that is
handled, or an over-filled container.  At greatest risk are
waste handlers and transporters.  Examples of proper waste
containment and disposal for employee protection to
bloodborne pathogens would be disposal of sharp items in a
puncture-proof container and other blood-contaminated items
into leak-proof plastic bags.  This waste should then either
be incinerated or be decontaminated by autoclaving before
disposal into a sanitary landfill.  An infectious waste
management plan is recommended by OSHA for the
identification, collection, handling, transport, treatment,
and disposal of potentially infectious waste (58).
Training
Effective training is a critical element of every
health and safety program.  It will ensure that employees
understand the occupational risks presented to them and the
control measures used to manage them.  It can also inform
them of appropriate actions to take in the case of an
emergency, existing regulation/guidelines applicable to the
occupation, and inform them of surveillance and prophylaxis
programs they can/should participate in.  In addition, a
bloodborne pathogen training program should include an
explanation of the epidemiology, symptomatology, and modes
of transmission of the diseases to ensure that the worker
has a basic understanding of the diseases and the need to
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observe precautions to prevent disease transmission.
Training for bloodborne pathogens should also include an
explanation of "universal precautions".  The infection
control plan should be explained and the appropriate methods
for recognizing tasks that may include exposure to blood and
other potentially infectious materials should be emphasized.
Special training consideration, such as standard
microbiology practices and techniques, may also be presented
to those workers in research and production facilities where
concentrated HIV and HBV cultures are handled and
manipulated. (58)
Hazard Communication; Signs and Labels
Signs and labels serve many important purposes in risk
management, first and foremost to warn employees of the
hazards to which they are exposed.  They can also act as an
important "memory-jog" for trained employees as well as a
warning for those not aware of a hazard.  They also alert
employees of possible exposure to materials, contents or
work areas that can not be readily identified.  For
bloodborne pathogens, labels reading Biohazard with the
universal biohazard symbol in black should be affixed to
refrigerators and freezers storing blood or potentially
infectious materials, containers used to store or transport
the same, and non-red bags and non-red containers storing
potentially infectious waste (58).  Biohazard warning signs
should also be posted at all entrances to research
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laboratories or production facilities with the name of the
infectious agent, special provisions for entry into the
area, and name and telephone number of the laboratory
director on the sign.  This assures that employees are aware
of the specific biohazard involved, that authorized
individuals who enter the area are properly protected, and
that, in the event of an emergency or other unforeseen
event, a trained and knowledgeable individual can be
contacted and consulted. (58)
Vaccination
The goal of the aforementioned occupational risk
management options is to minimize or eliminate significant
risks.  However, accidents do happen, equipment may fail or
be defective, employees may have unsuspecting cuts or
dermatitis and work-practice behavior is far from
infallible.  Thus if the risk of infection is high enough,
the manifestations of the infection are serious, and the
effective treatment of the infection is low (ie.. viruses),
a vaccine should be administered to further reduce or
eliminate occupational infection.  For the bloodborne
pathogens, one such vaccine has been available since 1982.
The hepatitis vaccine induces protective antibody levels in
85% to 97% of healthy adults (36,55) and provides protection
against HBV infection for at least 7 years (4).  The vaccine
is by far the most important part of HBV prevention among
workers who come in contact with blood and other body
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fluids.  It is estimated, however, that only 30 to 40% of
high-risk health-care workers have been vaccinated in this
country (58).
Post-Exposure Determination, Documentation and Surveillance
The route of exposure, the source patient's antibody
status, the circumstances under which the exposure occurred,
and the surveillance of the exposed employee for sero¬
conversion are important parts of any infection control
plan.  First, such information gives the employer some
feedback regarding the most prevalent circumstances and
routes of exposure of employees so that greater effort can
be concentrated on decreasing or eliminating the causes of
the exposure.  Secondly, post-exposure surveillance ensures
that the employee will receive proper medical attention
after an exposure.  Early testing of the employees blood as
soon as possible after exposure to determine baseline
serological status, appropriate prohylaxis and counseling if
needed, and further screening of the blood to identify
possible occupational infection are important steps in
reducing the risk of infection and preventing further
transmission should infection occur. (55,58)
Safety Inspection/Auditing
The final element integral to successful occupational
risk management is measurement and evaluation of these risk
control methods.  Are they effective?  Are guidelines.
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regulations and policies complied with?  Are further
modifications of an infection control plan needed to develop
optimum results?  These are some of the questions answered
by conducting an audit or safety inspection.  Besides the
more obvious compliance aspects, the audit can also act as a
means of prevention and identification.  It helps eliminate
causative factors associated with the loss problem, before a
loss occurs (50) and can identify new or other potential
problems that have not been addressed by present risk
management techniques.  (See figure 5)  In addition to
improved compliance and reduced risk, auditing can also
demonstrate to potential investors that safety and health
liabilities are under control while improving corporate
image and employee confidence.
Auditing can take many forms; however in the
occupational environment it usually means assessing all
levels of management, policies, guidelines and attitudes.
This can be achieved by physically inspecting a facility and
observing engineering controls, work-practice techniques,
personal protection use, etc.. utilized and performed by the
employees and by reviewing policies and programs on paper to
make sure they are complete.  The latter form of auditing is
often the most important form.  For example, when inspecting
a facility for bloodborne pathogen hazards, OSHA Instruction
CPL 2-2.44B dictates that a facility's infection control
plan is the first item to be audited, before a physical
walk-around occurs (51).  If the plan is incomplete, the
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auditor knows that certain parts of the missing plan will
not be carried out in the workplace.
Auditing is usually best achieved with an audit team
that is well-staffed and appropriately trained.  Strong
consideration should be given to an outside auditor who is
likely to be more objective, would not inconvenience or
intrude on the time of the organization's staff, and usually
adds expertise.  Procedures developed in creating the audit
should also be consistent and provide reproducible results
throughout all facilities involved in the auditing program.
It is also essential that one confront the consequences of
the knowledge that may be revealed after inspection.  This
requires the need to document audit findings as well as
insure proper communication and implementation of corrective
actions.  (See figure 5)
Lastly, it is important that management recognize
auditing as an important tool in measuring the success of a
compliance or preventative program.  Frequent measurement
and review of a program success will help to assure that it
is successful.  For bloodborne pathogens, the development of
an comprehensive audit program for assessment of the risk
management issues encountered in OSHA's proposed standard is
recommended.
CHAPTER VI
BLOODBORNE PATHOGEN AUDIT SYSTEM
Background and Scope
The scope of OSHA's blood-borne pathogen standard is to
regulate all occupational environments where exposure of a
worker HIV and/or HBV is a potential threat.  While this
includes a number of health-care and emergency response
professions, to develop an efficient audit that incorporates
the unique environment and procedures found in each setting
would be an arduous and lengthy task as well impractical.
Instead the audit system developed by this researcher is
designed to evaluate the specific environment of two of the
more important potential sources of biological bloodborne
hazards, research/clinical laboratories and production
facilities.  It is based on a typical occupational setting,
taking into account such laboratory elements as facility
design, equipment used, work practice and techniques
performed, and engineering controls.  More than 150
laboratories and production facilities were evaluated for
biological hazards in the development of this audit
protocol.  It has been refined to provide an efficient and
timely instrument to identify occupational risks to
bloodborne pathogens. (See Appendix B)
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The computer software program, PC File, is recommended
for managing the information generated from this audit
system.  This program was used to store audit data and
generate individual reports for each laboratory or facility,
noting deficiencies and providing risk management
strategies.   Examples of these reports are included in
Appendix C.  The database can also be used to manipulate
data into graphs and tables as well as provide emergency
response capabilities.
Applications
This audit system will be particularly useful for the
following applications.
a) The first and most obvious one is to insure that a
facility or laboratory is in compliance with the
proposed and soon to be promulgated blood-borne
pathogen standard
b) Avoid a citation if inspected by OSHA
c) Improve laboratory safety and awareness
d) evaluate the effectiveness of existing or newly
adopted Biological Safety (BS) or Infection Control
(IC) Programs.
e) Identify BS or IC program deficiencies when compared
with the new federal standard.
f) Identify and correct exposure pathways
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g) Classify facilities as high, medium or low risk on
the basis of potential occupational exposures to
bloodborne pathogens
This audit system offers a range of applications that
can be utilized by both private companies and governmental
agencies. Safety professionals including industrial
hygienists, biological safety officers, laboratory managers,
laboratory personnel, consultants, and contractors should
benefit from it's use.  (See Appendix D for an outline of
the audit instrument)  However because of it's comprehensive
nature, it is of little use to an OSHA inspector who by the
current standard instructive (OSHA Instruction CPL 2-2.44B,
paragraph J, inspections procedures #7) is directed to
inspect using a spot-check approach. "....It is not expected
that a comprehensive walkaround inspection of the workplace
will be necessary (51)."
Risk Classification of Facilities Using Fault Tree Analysis
Fault trees can be used to analyze and evaluate the
fallibility of complex systems, or the failure of a system
in the absence or low occurrence of an actual failure
experience.  The first step in this analysis is to identify
an undesirable event and reason back to determine how it
might have happened.  Most fault trees determine actual
failure rates or probabilities for each factor that may
contribute to the undesirable event.  The fault tree method
has been evolving for the last 20 years and is one of the
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most widely used techniques for quantitative prediction of
system failure. (40)
Using the proposed audit instrument as a guide, a fault
tree analysis was prepared to rank facilities on the basis
of occupational risk to bloodborne pathogens.  The single
most important risk or "fault" in the laboratory setting was
identified as an exposure incident to blood or other
potentially infectious materials.  There was insufficient
quantitative data to determine actual failure rates or
probabilities leading to an exposure incident, however, a
qualitative evaluation of the contributing factors in
occupationally acquired HIV or HBV infection was possible.
(See Figure 6)  The contributing factors were classified
into four general groups: engineering and work practice
controls, personal protection, hazard communication such as
signs and labels, and policies/training/programs.  These
factors, if disregarded or poorly implemented, can lead to
four outcomes: percutaneous inoculation, mucous membrane
exposure, non intact skin exposure, or no direct or indirect
exposure.  Each of these exposure routes have different
probabilities of infection associated with them.
Percutaneous inoculation presents the highest risk of
infection, 6% to 30% of percutaneous inoculations with a
known HBV source acquired infection, whereas, with a known
HIV positive source, approximately 0.5% seroconverted
(55,58).  Any single contributing factor or combination of
factors elements that can lead to percutaneous inoculation
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FIG 6
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS AND RISK CLASSMCATION OF AN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE
IN THE CLINICAL / RESEARCH LABORATORY OR PRODUCTION FACILITY
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were considered high risk activities or practices.  These
factors, when discovered, place a facility at high risk.
These elements are identified in the first column of the
fault tree and are coded by reference to the audit
instrument.
The risk of infection from mucous membrane exposure or
non intact skin exposure, while inadequately quantified, is
considered to be far less then percutaneous inoculation by
the CDC (55).  Thus, any contributing factors or combination
of factors that potentially could lead to this type of
exposure were classified as medium risk relative to the risk
of percutaneous inoculation.  These activities placed a
facility in the medium risk category.
There are also factors shown in the audit that do not
contribute directly or even indirectly to exposure, but may
play some tertiary role or have a cumulative effect that
leads to an exposure incident.  Facilities delinquent in
these areas present no immediate risk to the health of the
worker and are therefore considered low risk relative to
percutaneous inoculation, mucous membrane exposure, or non
intact skin exposures.
It should be pointed out that the fault tree analysis
only identifies one type of risk involved in an exposure
incident scenario.  This is the risk posed by the audit
factors lead to high, medium and low risk types of exposure.
They appropriately can be defined as contributory or
exposure risk.  However, there are many tiers of risk
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involved in an occupational exposure scenario.  First, once
an exposure incident occurs, one must identify if the source
of the exposure is HIV/HBV positive.  This can be defined as
source risk.  If the source is known positive, one is at a
higher risk of infection then if the source is unknown.  If
the source is a known negative for HIV/HBV, one is at no to
low risk of infection.  There is still some risk associated
with a negative source since it may be a false negative.  If
the source is identified as HBV positive, one has a much
higher chance of infection then if the source was identified
as HIV positive due to the relative viral concentrations in
the blood between the two.  Source risk can be altered,
however, depending on the type of infected material
involved.  For example, an exposure to a concentrated
laboratory culture of HIV or HBV can severely increase the
risk of infection over that of infected blood.  The
virulence of the organism, or the degree to which an
organism can cause disease may also play a role.  If someone
is exposed to the antigen of a virus instead of the complete
virus, or exposed to a culture that has been heat
inactivated or partially treated in some form, the risk of
infection is again altered.  Finally, the risk of clinical
manifestations of an infection depends on the specific
immune system status of the individual infected, which
further relies on such factors as age, sex, diet, stress,
and the presence of protective antibodies as created by
vaccination.  Thus, while the OSHA standard is intended to
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prevent and eliminate the risks involved with an exposure
incident, there are a myriad of risks after exposure occurs
that can alter the outcome, an infectious disease.
CHAPTER VII
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE OSHA BLOODBORNE PATHOGEN
REGULATIONS
The impact the bloodborne pathogens standard will have
on human health and the economics of the health-care
industry is considerable.  Whether this impact will be
positive or negative is widely debated.  The public comment
period on the proposed regulations, OSHA's largest
substantive record in its history, brought to light many of
these advantages and disadvantages of the standard in its
current form.  What effect these comments will have in
altering the rule before it is promulgated is still unknown.
However, when asked about changes to the rule before it is
finalized, OSHA Health Standards Director Adkins said, "We
don't expect a large number of changes, but there could be
some (33)." • .
Two elements of the proposed standard brought the
sharpest and by far the most reiterated criticism.  The
first of these was the issuing of a free HBV vaccine by
employers to workers who are exposed to the virus an average
of one or more times a month.  Many argue, especially labor
organizations, that any worker at risk to exposure in the
course of duty should receive the vaccine (20,24,25) and
that with OSHA'S proposal, many employees who may not
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receive an average of one exposure a month may receive a few
massive exposures to blood a few times a year.  These
workers, such as public safety personnel, would fall through
the cracks and not be vaccinated.  Other groups, such as
hospitals, argued that offering the vaccine is unnecessary
and too costly, adding between $30,000 to $60,000 initial
expense per 500 employees (30).  Other arguments maintained
that an employee exposed an average of one time a month is
certainly not high risk, especially with the use of personal
protection and universal precautions.
The second most criticized element of the standard was
the way OSHA established the hierarchy of controls.  Many
felt that the proposed rule does not emphasize engineering
controls over personal protective equipment and work
practices as the most effective means of preventing
exposure(21,32).  Among the engineering controls most
commonly discussed were the mandatory use of safer needles
and syringes, provided by redesign or by other items as
self-sheathing devices.  A standard that mandates this would
encourage manufacturers to produce safer instruments (33).
OSHA's proposed regulation states that needles should not be
recapped, should be completely discarded, and complete
needle/syringe unit type should be required.  Janine Jagger,
assistant professor of neurosurgery at University of
Virginia, declared that needlestick injuries are
distressingly common among health-care workers and may be
the "single most preventable hazard that health-care workers
55
face," and that improved product designs are being "largely-
overlooked as a method for preventing the spread of
bloodborne pathogens in the health-care setting (22)."
Other criticisms attack the extensiveness of OSHA's
proposed infection control plan which requires that
employers identify and document tasks and procedures where
occupational exposure to potentially infectious materials
may take place.  To do this, especially in large health-care
facilities, would be a monumental administrative burden and
very costly.  As John D. Brinsko, an industrial hygienist
with Vanderbilt University, stated "certainly this
requirement is not in line with the federal reduction of
paperwork guidelines you are hopefully trying to follow
(19,31) . "
Another issue which was consistently brought up was
that of personal protection.  Many feel that the rule, as
written, would interfere with a worker's mobility and manual
dexterity, discouraging its use.  Specifically, barrier
clothing and gloves are hot and uncomfortable and do not
protect against needlesticks, and unless covering an open
wound or non-intact skin, provide no significant reduction
in risk (19,25,30).  The American Hospital Association
states that the OSHA proposed provisions "do not provide
useful criteria for selecting equipment that reduces
possible exposures without interfering with the workers
ability to perform (19)".
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Other issues debated were compliance costs (28), OSHA's
cost benefit analysis (32), the scope of the regulations
excluding raw sewage workers and students (20,26), and a
request for clearer definitions (23).
While many of the above comments had justifiable,
definitional problems with the proposed standard, many are
unfounded when looked at in the light of one of the biggest
inherent properties of the proposed regulation, that it is
written as a performance standard, allowing for some
interpretation.  One of the elements that tends to make the
proposed standard of the performance type, is the
incorporation of CDC's universal precautions, which urges
workers to treat all fluids they come in contact with as if
they were infected with HIV or HBV and take proper
precautions.  Regulatory backing of the CDC guidelines is
looked at as one of the major advantages of the rule because
it allows new information on HIV to be automatically
incorporated into an enforceable standard, instead of
establishing fixed regulations that would become obsolete
over time (21,24).  Others praise the new standard which
would finally unify all existing guidelines and work
practices in the health-care setting that are currently
uneven in their effectiveness and application (25).
The most convincing advantage of the proposed standard
is the protection it will provide to the health of health¬
care employees.  In the proposed standard, OSHA has
presented quantitative estimates of risk of death and
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clinical illness from occupational exposure to HBV-infected
blood and other potentially infectious materials (58).  The
Agency estimates the lifetime risk of infection from HBV to
be from 75 to 119 cases per thousand and the risks of
material impairment of health or functional capacity
(clinical hepatitis) to be from 20 to 31 per thousand.  The
risk of death from HBV is 2 to 3 per 1000.  These estimates
are based on the assumption of exposure to HBV for the
period of a working lifetime of 45 years.  This translates
to 12,000 hepatitis B infections and approximately 260
deaths annually among health-care workers (11,58).
Moreover, OSHA's risk assessment shows that if every
employee were to receive the HBV vaccine, there would still
be a remaining lifetime risk of material impairment of
health of 2 to 3 per 1000 workers and 2 to 3 deaths per
10,000 workers based on the 90% efficacy of the vaccine.
These numbers could be further reduced with the adherence to
a standard which included the elements of personal
protection, engineering controls, and work practice
controls.  The number of occupationally acquired infections
from HIV and the risks involved are hard to currently
quantify because of the lack of sufficient data.  Recently,
the CDC estimates there are some 6000 U.S. health-care
workers infected with HIV, about 40 of them infected through
known work-related causes (34), and many others with no
defined risk.  As the number of AIDS cases continues to rise
in the general population, the rate of occupational risk is
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also expected to increase as well, but by how much is
unknown.
Besides risks to health, there are economic risks
involved with occupational infection.  It is estimated that
health-care costs for HBV and HCV in health-care workers is
$10 to 12 million annually (11).  Estimates of average
lifetime costs for the care of an AIDS patient have varied
considerably, but recent evidence suggests the amount is
probably in the range of $50,000 to $75,0000 dollars (11).
In addition, the cost of postexposure follow-up, including
vaccination, screening, treatment, and counselling is
estimated at $405 per needlestick (32).  Companies may also
want to consider potential litigation costs for suits
brought by workers who contract bloodborne disease through
negligence in the workplace.  These costs, coupled with the
more intangible costs of lost productivity, lost time,
quality of life, and mental/emotional suffering, could be
seriously reduced or avoided by compliance with the proposed
regulations.
In light of the devastating health effects by HIV and
HBV and the economic costs to support an occupationally
infected individual, it certainly seems there is a need for
regulation of bloodborne pathogens in the workplace,
especially for those at high risk.  Two of the workplaces at
high risk are research laboratories and production
facilities where concentrated cultures of HIV and HBV, much
higher than that found in the blood, are often worked with.
59
An audit system, designed especially to assess these types
of environments, is key in preventing occupational
infection.  Such a instrument is an effective way of
achieving compliance with the bloodborne standard as well as
a method which can be used to identify facilities at risk.
As the final rule nears promulgation, it was announced
that the nation's first health-care worker infected with HIV
on the job has died in her home on June 6, 1991 (34).  With
approximately 40 more workers likewise infected with HIV in
the workplace and the incidence of HIV infection increasing
rapidly in the general population, with 1.5 million people
currently infected, HIV is becoming an increasingly
important hazard in the health-care industry that needs to
be addressed.  This coupled with the known hazard of HBV
that results in 12,000 occupational health-care worker
infections and 200 to 300 health-care worker deaths each
year, and the emergence and recognition of other important
bloodborne pathogens such as HCV, regulation is sorely
needed.  Publication of the final rule will mark the
completion of a long and extensive process undertaken by
OSHA, to regulate a hazard that has traditionally been
ignored in the occupational setting, a biological hazard.
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APPENDIX  A
CURRENT REPORT
this address. Ail timely submissions will
be part of the record of the proceeding.
Information on Hepatitis B Vaccination
Issues for the Public Hearing
OSHA seeks to gather additional
info: mation related to hepatitis B
v::;;cination during the written comment
period and the public hearing. Since the
':mployee's participation in the hepatitis
B vaccination program is voluntary,
OSHA is particularly interested in
' ͣxistiiig HBV vaccination programs that
have achieved a high degree of
\oluntary employee comphance. The
Agency will attempt to identify those
elements that are common to successful
programs and will provide this
information to all employers. In
addition, we are also seeking
information on other issues including
availability, cost and any potential
distribution problems that are
associated with initiating the
vaccination of large numbers of
employees within the 150 day period
following the effective date of the
standard.
The Agency intends to designate
several days of the Washington, DC
hearing to focus on the issues
surrounding HBV vaccination. We
ercourage hearing participants whose
pr'mar>' testimony will involve hepatitis
n '. dccination to indicate this in their
Notice of intention To Appear, and
03MA will attempt to schedule these
participants on the days of the hearing
that are set aside to focus on Hepatitis B
vaccination. Other participants whose
ieatimony wiil not be primarily on HBV
vaccination issues but who wish to
address HBV vaccination will be
scheduled on another day, but they may
(;ntt'r a separate statement in the record
u'lring this penod. In any case,
(la: ticipants are free to discuss hepatitis
B vaccination or any other issue related
!o this standard whenever they present
it-.eir testimony.
Certification of Record and Final
Detcirnination After Hearing
F(.lUov^!ng the close of the hearing, the
pi esiding Administrative Law Judge wiii
cprtity the record of the hearing to the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health. The
.Ainiinistrative Law Judge does not
make or recommend any decisions as to
the content of the final standard.
The proposed standard will be
reviewed in light of all testimony and
written submissions received as part of
the record, and a standard will be
issued, based on the entire record of the
proceeding, including the written
comments and data received from the
public.
XI. Authority and Signature
This document was prepared under
the direction of Alan C. McMillan,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S.
Department of Labor. 200 Constitution
Avenue NW.. Washington, DC 20210.
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 6(b),
S(c) and 6(g] of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655,
657), 29 CFR Part 1911 and Secretary of
Labor's Order No. 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 29
CFR Part 1910 is proposed to be
amended as set forth below.
List of Subjects in 29 CFR Part 1910
AIDS, Hepatitis B, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, Blood, Blood
diseases. Communicable disease,
Health, Healthcare, Health professions,
Hospitals, Protective equipment.
Immunization, Medical re.iearch.
Occupational safety and health.
Signed at Washington. DC on this 19th day
of May, 1989.
Alan C. McMillan,
Acting Asaistant Secretary ofLc bar.
XIL The Proposed Standard
General Industry
Parts 1910 of Title 29 of the Cede of
Federal Regulations are proposed to be
amended as follows:
PART 1910—{AMENDED!
Subpart Z—[Amended]
1. The general authority cilatiun for
Subpart Z of 29 CFR Part 1910 continues
to read as follows and a new citation for
§ 1910.1030 is added:
Authority: Sees. 6 and 8. Occupational
Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. 655. 657,
Secretary of Labor's Orders Nos. 12-71 (36 FR
8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), or 9-83 (48 FR
35736), as applicable'; and 29 CFR Part 1911.
ͣ        *        •        *        *
Section 1910.1030 also issued under 29
U.S.C. 653.
2. Section 1910.1030 is added to read
as follows:
§ 1910.1030   Bloodt>ome pathogens.
(a) Scope and application. This
section applies to all occupational
exposure to blood or other potentially
infectious materials as defined by
paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this
section, the following shall apply:
"Assistant Secretary" means the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, or
designated representative.
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"Blood" means human blood, human
blood components and products made
from human blood.
"Bloodbome Pathogens" means
pathogenic microorganisms that are
present in human blood and can cause
disease in humatis. These pathogens
include, but are not limited to, hepatitis
B virus (HBV) and human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
"Clinical Laboratory" means a
workplace where diagnostic or other
screening procedures are performed on
blood or other potentially infectious
materials.
"Director" means the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, or
designated representative.
"Disinfect" means to inactivate
virtually all recognized pathogenic
microorganisms but not necessarily ail
microbial forms (e.g. bacterial
endospores) on inanimate objects.
"Engineering Goirtrols" means
controls that isolate or remove the
hazard from the workplace.
"Exposure Incident" meane a specific
eye, mouth, other mucous membrane,
non-intact skin, or parenteral contact
with blood or other potentially
infectious materials that results from the
performance of an employee's duties.
"Infectious Waste" m.eans blood and
blood products, contaminated sharps,
pathological wastes, and
microbiological wastes.
"Occupational Exposure" means
reasonably anticipated skin, eye,
mucous membrane, or parenteral
contact with blood or other potentially
infectious materials that may result from
the performance of an employee's
duties. This definition excludes
incidental exposures that may take
place on the job. and that are neither
reasonably nor routinely expected and
that the worker is not required to incur
in the normal course of employment.
"Other Potentially Infectious
.Materials" means
(1) The following body fluids: semen,
vaginal secretions, cerebrospinal fluid,
synovial fluid, pleural fluid, pericardial
tluid, peritoneal fluid , amniotic fluid,
saliva in dental procedures, and any
body fluid that is visibly contaminated
with blood.
(2) Any unfixed tissue or organ (other
than intact skin) from a human (hving or
dead) and
(3) HIV- or HBV-containing cell or
tissue cultures, organ cultures, and
culture medium or other solutions; and
blood, organs or other tissues from
experimental animals infected with HIV
jr HBV.
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"Parenteral" means exposure
occurring as a result of piercing the skin
Trier (e.g. subcutaneous,
amuscular, intravenous routes).
_   Patient" means any individual, living
or dead, whose blood, body fluids,
tissues, or organs may be a source of
^posure to ^e employee. Example*
include, but are not limited to, hospital
and clinic patients; clients in institutions
for the mentally retarded; trauma
victims; clients of drug and alcohol
treatment facilities: residents of
hospices and nursing homes; htmian
remains prior to embalming; and
individuals who donate or sell blood or
blood components.
"Personal Protective Equipment" is
specialized clothing or equipment worn
by an employee to protect him/her from
a hazard.
"Production Facility'' means a facility
engaged in industrial-scale, large-
volume production of HIV or HBV or in
high concentration production of HIV or
HBV.
"Research Laboratory"^ means a
laboratory producing research-
laboratory-scale amounts of HIV or
HBV.
"Sharps" means any object that can
penetrate the skin including, but not
limited to, needles, scalpels, and broken
capillary tubes.
^'Sterilize" means the use of a physical
hemical procedure to destroy all
crobial life including highly resistant
bacterial endospores.
"Universal precautions" is a method
of infection control in which all human
blood and certain human body fluids are
treated as if known to be infectious for
HIV, HBV and other bloodbome
pathogens.
"Work Practice Controls" means
controls that reduce the likelihood of
exposure by altering the manner in
which a task is performed.
(c) Infection control— (1) Exposure
Determination, (i) Each employer who
has employees writh occupational
exposure as defined by paragraph (b] of
this section shall identify and document
those tasks and procedures where
occupational exposures may take place.
(it) Each employer shall identify and
document all positions with
occupational exposure.
(iii) This exposure determination shall
be made without regard to the use of
personal protective equipment.
(2) Infection Control Plan, (i) Each
employer having employees whose
reasonably anticipated duties may result
in occupational exposure shall establish
a^written infection control plan designed
""    inimize or eliminate employee
osure.
^^mc)
a wr
(ii) This infection control plan shall
contain the following as a minimum;
(A) The exposure determination
required by paragraph (c)(1) and
(B) The schedule and tnethod of
implementation for each of the
applicable paragraphs of this standard.
(iii) This infection control plan shall
be reviewed and updated as necessary
to reflect significant changes in tasks op
procedures.
(iv) The infection control plan shall be
made available to the Assistant
Secretary and the Director for
examination and copying.
(d) Methods of Compliance— (1)
General. Universal precautions shall be
observed to prevent contact with blood
and other potentially infectious
materials, unless those precautions
would interfere with the proper delivery
of health care or public safefy services
in a partiealar einmrnstance. or would
create a significant risk to the personal
safefy of theivorker.
(2) Engineering and work practice
controls, (i) Engtaeering controb shall
be examined and maintained or
replaced on a tegui^ schedule to ensure
their effectiveness.
(ii) Employees shall wash their hands
immediately or as soon a« possible after
removal of gloves or other personal
protective equipment and after hand
contact with blood or other potentially
infectious materials.
(iii) All personal protective equipment
shall be removed immediately upon
leaving the work area or as soon as
possible if overtly contaminated and
placed in an appropriately designated
area or container for storage, washing,
decontamination or disposal.
(iv) Used needles and other sharps
shall not be sheared, bent, broken,
recapped, or resheathed by hand. Used
needles shall not be removed from
disposable syringes.
(v) Eating, drinking, smoking, applying
cosmetics or lip balm, and handling
contact lenses are prohibited in work
areas where there is a potential for
occupational exposure.
(vi) Food and drink shall not be stored
in refrigerators; freezers, or cabinets
where blood or other potentially
infectious materials are stored or in
other areas of possible contamination.
(vii) All procedures involving blood or
other potentially infectious materials
shall be performed in such a manner as
to minimize splashing, spraying, and
aerosolization of these substances.
(viii) Mouth pipetting/suctioning is
prohibited.
(3) Personal protective equipment—
(i) Provision and Use. When there is a
potential for occupational exposure, the
employer shall provide and assure that
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the employee uses appropriate personal
protective equipment such as. but not
limited to, gloves; gowns, fluid-proof
aprons, laboratory coats, and head and
foot coverings; face shields or masks
and eye protection; and mouthpieces,
resuscitation bags, pocket masks, or
other ventilation devices.
(ii) Accessibility. The employer shall
assure that appropriate personal
protective equipment in the appropriate
sizes is readily accessible at the
worksite or issued to employees.
Hypoallergenic gloves shall be readily
accessible to those employees who are
allergic to the gloves normally provided.
(iii) Cleaning. The employer shall
provide for the cleaning, laundering or
disposal of personal protective
equipment required by paragraphs (d)
and (e) of this standard.
(iv) Repair and replacement. The
employer shall repair or replace
required personal protective equipment
as needed to n^aintain its effectiveness.
(v) Gloves. Gloves shall be worn
when the employee has the potential for
the hands to have direct skin contact
with blood, other potentially infectious
materials, mucous membranes, non-
intact skin, and when handling items or
surfaces soiled with blood or other
potentially infectious materials.
(A) Disposable (single use) gloves,
such as surgical or examination gloves,
shall be replaced as soon as possible
when visibly soiled, torn, punctured, or
when their abilify to function as a
barrier is compromised. They shall not
be washed or disinfected for re-use.
(B) Utility gloves may be disinfected
for re-use if the integrity of the glove is
not compromised, however they must be
discarded if they are cracked, peeling,
discolored, torn, punctured, or exhibit
other signs of deterioration.
(vi) Masks, Eye Protection, and Face
Shields. Masks and eye protection or
chin-length face shields shall be worn
whenever splashes, spray, spatter,
droplets, or aerosols of blood or other
potentially infectious materials may be
generated and there is a potential for
eye, nose, or mouth contamination.
(vii) Gowns, Aprons, and Other
Protective Body Clothing. Appropriate
protective clothing shall be worn when
the employee has a potential for
occupational exposure. The type and
characteristics will depend upon the
task and degree of exposure anticipated:
however, the clothing selected shall
form an effective barrier.
(A) Gowns, lab coats, aprons, or
similar clothing shall be worn if there is
a potential for soiling of clothes with
blood or other potentially infectious
materials.
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(B) Fluid-resistant clothing shall be
worn if there is h pot"ntial for splashing
or spraying of blood or other potentially
infectious materials.
ͣ'C) Surgical caps or huods shall be
worn 'f there is a potential for splashing
or splattering of blood or other
poteiUiHlly infectious materials on the
head.
[U] Fluid-proof clothing shall be worn
if there is a potential for clothing
becoming soaked with blood or other
potentially infectious materials.
(E) Fluid-proof shoe covers shall be
worn if there is a potential for shoes to
become contaminated and/or soaked
with blood or other potentially
infectious materials.
(4) Housekeeping—(i) Genera!.
Employers shall assure that the worksite
is maintained in a clean and sanitary
condition. The employer shall determine
and implement the appropriate written
schedule for cleaning and method of
disinfection based upon the location
within the facility, type of surface to be
cleaned, type of soil present, and tasks
or procedures being performed.
(ii] Cleaning and Disinfection. All
eciuipment and environmental and
working surfaces shall be properly
cleaned and disinfected after contact
with blood or other potentially
infectious materials.
(A) Work surfaces shall he
decontaminated with an appropriate
disinfectant after completion of
procedures: when surfaces are overtly
contaminated; immediately after any
spill of blood or other potentially
infectious materials: and at the end of
the work shift.
(B) Protective coverings such as
plastic wrap, aluminum foil, or
'mperviously-backed absorbent paper
may be used to cover equipment and
environmental surfaces. These coverings
shall be removed and replaced at the
end of the work shift or when they
become overdy contaminated.
(C) Equipment which may become
contaminated with blood or other
potentially infectious materials shall be
checked routinely and prior to servicing
or shipping and shall be decontaminated
ds necessary.
(D) All bins, pails, cans, and similar
receptacles intended for reuse which
have a potential for becoming
contaminated with blood or other
potentially infectious materials shall be
inspected, cleaned, and disinfected on a
regularly scheduled basis and cleaned
and disinfected immediately or as soon
as possible upon visible contamination.
(E) Broken glassware which may be
contaminated shall no; be picked up
directly with the hands. It shall be
cleaned up using mechanical means.
such as a brush and dust pan, a vacuum
cleaner, tongs, cotton swabs or forceps.
(F) Specimens of blood or other
potentially infectious materials shall be
placed in a closable, leakproof container
labeled or color-coded according to
{paragraph fg)(l){ii) prior to being stored
Or tran.-?portrd. If outside contamination
of the prim.ary container is likely, then a
Second leakproof container that is
labeled or color-coded according to
paragraph (g)(l)(ii) shall be placed over
the outside of the first and closed to
prevent leakage during handling,
^torage, or transport. If puncture of the
primary container is likely, it shall be
placed within a leakproof, puncture-
resistant secondary container.
(G) Reusable items contaminated with
blood or other potentially infectious
r^iaterials shall be decontaminated prior
t^ washing and/or reprocessing.
(iii) Infectious Waste Disposal. (A) All
infectious waste destined for disposal
^hall be placed in closable, leakproof
cfontainers or bags that are color coded
r labeled as required by paragraph
)(l)(ii) of this standard,
(ij If outside contamination of the
ontainer or bag is likely to occur then a
econd leakproof container or bag which
IB closable and labeled or color-coded
s described in paragraph (g)(l](ii] shall
e placed over the outside of the first
^nd closed to prevent leakage during
' andling, storage, and transport,
[2] Disposal of all infectious waste
hall be in accordance with applicable
ederal, state, and local regulations,
(B] Immediately after use. sharps shall
e disposed of in closable, puncture
i|esistant, disposable containers which
re leakproof on the sides and bottom
nd that are labeled or color-coded
ccording to paragraph (g)(ll(ii).
[1] These containers shall be easily
Accessible to personnel and located in
Ee immediate area of use.
[2] These containers shall be replaced
lutinely and not allowed to overfill,
[iv] Laundry. (A) Laundry from
orkplaces with employees covered
jinder paragraph (a) of this section thatis contaminated with blood or other
otentially infectious materials or may
ontain contaminated sharps shall be
reated as if it were contaminated and
hall be handled as httle as possible and
.vUh a minimum of agitation.
[1] Contaminated laundry shall be
agged at the location where it was
Used and shall not be sorted or rinsed in
patient-care areas.I  [2] Contaminated laundry shall be
placed and transported in bags that are
labeled or color-coded as described in
paragraph (gKl)(ii)- Whenever this
laundry is wet and presents the
potential for soak-through of or leakage
from the bag, it shall be placed and
transported in leakproof bags.
(B) The employer shall ensure that
laundry workers wear protective gloves
and other appropriate personal
protective equipment to prevent
occupational exposure during h.nidlipg
or sorting.
(e) HIV and HBV Research
Laboratories and Production Facilities.
(1) This paragraph applies to research
laboratories and production facilities
engaged in the culture, production,
concentration, and manipulation of HIV
and HBV. It does not apply to clinical or
diagnostic laboratories engaged solely
in the analysis of blood, tissues, or
organs. These requirements apply in
additicn to the other requirements of tha
standard.
(2) Research laboratories and
production facilities shall meet the
following criteria:
(i) Standard microbiological
practices. All infectious liquid or solid
waste shall be decontaminated before
being disposed of.
(ii) Special practices. (A) Laboratory
doors shall be kept closed when work
involving HIV or HBV is in progress.
(B) Contaminated materials that are to
be decontaminated at a site away from
the work area shall be placed in a
durable, leakproof container that is
closed before being removed from the
work area.
(C) Access to the work area siiail be
limited to authorized persons only.
Policies and procedures shall be
established whereby only persons who
have been advised of the potential
biohazard. who meet any specific entry
requirements, and who comply with all
entry and exit procedures shall be
allowed to enter the work areas and
animal rooms.
(D) When potentially infectious
materials or infected animals are
present in the work area or containment
module, a hazard warning sign
incorporating the universal biohazard
symbol shall be posted on all access
doors. The hazard warning sign shall
comply with the provisions ouUined in
paragraph (g)(l)(i) of this standard.
(E) All activities involving potentially
infectious materials shall be conducted
in biological safety cabinets or other
physical-containment devices within the
containment module. No work shall be
conducted in open vessels on the open
bench.
(F) Laboratory coats, gowns, smocks,
uniforms, or other appropriate protective
clothing shall be used in the work area
and animal rooms. Protective clothing
shall not be worn outside of the work
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area and shall be decontaminated
^fore being laundered.
] Special care shall be taken to
id skin contamination with
^tentially infectious materials. Gloves
shall be worn when handhng infected
asimals and when making hand contact
with potentially infectious materials is
unavoidable.
(H) All waste from work areas
including animal rooms shall be
decontaminated before disposal.
(I) Vacuum lines shall be protected
with high-efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) fitters and liquid disinfectant
traps.
(I) Hypodenaic needles and syringes
shall be used only for parenteral
injection and aspiration of Quids from
laboratory animals and diaphragm
bottles. Only needle-locking syringes or
disposable syringe-needle units (ie., the
needle is integral to the syringe) shall be
used for the infection or aspiration of
potentially infectious fluids. Extreme
caution shall be used when handling
needles and syringes to avoid
autoinoculation and the generation of
aerosols daring use and disposal. A
needle shall not be bent sheared,
replaced in the sheath or guard, or
removed from the syringe following use.
The needle and syringe shall be
romptly placed in a puncture-resistant
\ntainer and decontaminated,
eferably by autoclaving, before being
discarded or reused.
(K) Spills and accidents that result in
overt exposures of employees to
potentially infectious materials shall be
immediately reported to the laboratory
director or other responsible person.
(L) A biosafety manual shall be
prepared or adopted. Personnel shall be
advised of potential hazards, shall be
required to read instructions on
practices and procedures, and shall be
required to follow them.
(iii) Containment equipment. [A]
Certified biological safety cabinets
(Class I, II, or ill) or other appropriate
combinations of personal protection or
physical containment devices, such as
special protective clothing, respirators,
centrifuge safety cups, sealed centrifuge
rotors, and containment caging for
animals, shall be used for all activities
with potentially infectious materials that
pose a threat of exposure to droplets,
splashes, spills, or aerosols.
(B) Biological safety cabinets shall be
certified when installed, whenever they
are moved and at least annually.
(3) HIV and HBV research
laboratories shall meet the following
riteria:
(i) Each laboratory shall contain a
'ink for hand washing.
(ii) An autoclave for decontamination
of infectious laboratory waste shall be
available.
(4) HIV and HBV production facilities
shall meet the fbWowing criteria:
(i) The work areas shall be separated
from areas that are open to unrestricted
traffic flow within the building. Passage
through two sets of doors shall be the
basic requirement for entry into the
work area from access corridors or other
contiguous areas. Physical separation of
the high-containment work area from
access corridors or other areas or
activities may also be provided by a
double-doored clothes-change room
(showers may be included], airlock, or
other access facility that requires
passing through two sets of doors before
entering the work area.
(ii) The interior surfaces of walls,
floors and ceilings shall be water
resistant so that they can be easily
cleaned. Penetrations in these surfaces
shall be sealed or capable of being
sealed to facilitate decont^Buiation of
the work area.
(iii) Each work area shall contain a
sink for washing hands. The sink shall
be foot, elbow, or autmnatically
operated and shall be located near the
exit door of the work area.
(iv) Access doors to the work area or
containment module shall be self-
closing.
(v) An autoclave for decontamination
of infectious waste shall be available
within or as near as possible to the work
area.
(vi) A ducted exhaust-air ventilation
system shall be provided. This system
shall create directional airflow that
draws air into the work area through the
entry area. The exhaust air shall not be
recirculated to any other area of the
building, shall be discharged to the
outside, and shall be dispersed away
from occupied areas and air intakes.
The proper direction of the airflow shall
be verified (i.e., into the work area).
(5) Training requirements. Additional
training requirements for employees in
HIV and HBV research laboratories and
HIV and HBV production facilities are
specified in paragraph (g)(21{v).
(f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post
Exposure FoUow-uf>—{l) General, [i]
The employer shall make available
hepatitis B vaccination to all employees
who have occupational exposure on
average one or more times per month
and post-exposure follow-up for all
employees with an occupational
exposure incident.
(ii) The employer shall assure that all
medical evaluations and procedures are
performed by or under the supervision
of a licensed physician and that all
laboratory tests are conducted by an
accredited laboratory.
(iii) The employer shall assure that all
evaluations, procedures, vaccinations,
and post-exposure management are
provided to the employee at a
reasonable time and place, and
according to standard recommendations
for medical practice.
(2) HBV Vaccination, (i) HBV
vaccination shall be offered to all
employees occnpatianaUy exposed on
an average of one or more times per
month to blood or other potentially
infectioua materials, unless the
employee has a previous HBV
vaccination or unless antibody testing
has revealed that the employee is
immune. If the employee initially
declines HEV vaccination but at a later
date while still covered nndei the
standard decides to accept the HBV
vaccine, the employer shall provide the
vaccine at that time. Should a booster
dose(s] be recommended at a future
date, such booster dose(s] shall be
provided according to standard
recommendations for medical practice.
(ii) HBV antibody testing shall be
made available to an employee who
desires such testing prior to deciding
whether or not to receive HBV
vaccination. If the employee is found to
be immune to HBV by virtue of
adequate antibody titer, then the
employer is not required to offer the
HBV vaccine to that employee.
(3) Post exposure evaluation and
follow-up. Following a report of an
exposure incident, the employer shall
make available to each employee
covered by paragraph (a) a confidential
medical evaluation and fbriaw-up.
including at least the following
elements:
(i) Documentation of the route(s) of
exposure, HBV and HIV antibody status
of the source patient(s) (if known), and
the circumstances under which the
exposure occurred.
(ii) If the source patient can be
determined and permission is obtained.
collection of and testing of the source
patient's blood to determine the
presence of HIV or HBV infection.
(iii) Collection of blood from the
exposed employee as soon as possible
after the exposure incident for the
determination of HIV and/or HBV
status. Actual antibody or antigen
testing of the blood or serum sample
may be done at that time or at a later
date if the employee so requests.
(iv) Follow-up of the exposed
employee including antibody or antigen
testing, counseling, illness reporting, and
safe and effective post-exposure
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prophylaxis, according to standard
recommendations for medical practice.
(4) Information provided to the
physician. The employer shall provide
the fallowing information to the
evaluating physician:
(i) A copy of this regulation and its
appendices and
(ii) A description of the affected
employee's duties as they relate to the
employee's occupational exposure.
(5) Physician's written opinion. For
each evaluation under this section, the
employer shall obtain and provide the
employee with a copy of the evaluating
physician's written opinion within 15
working days of the completion of the
evaluation. The written opinion shall be
limited to the following Information:
(i) The physician's recommended
limitations upon the employee's ability
to receive hepatitis B vaccination.
[ii] A statement that the employee has
been informed of the results of the
medical evaluation and that the -
employee has been told about any
medical conditions resulting from
exposure to blood or other potentially
infectious materials which require
further evaluation or treatment.
[iii] Specific findings or diagnoses,
which are related to the employee's
ability to receive HBV vaccination. Any
other findings and diagnoses shall
remain confidential.
(6) Medical recordkeeping. Medical
records required by this standard shall
be maintained in accordance with
paragraph (h)(1) of this section.
(g) Communication of Hazards to
Employees—(1) Signs and Labels—(i)
Signs. The employer shall post signs at
the entrance to work areas specified in
paragraph (e) of this standard which
shall bear the following legend:
BIOHAZARO
[Name, telephone number of the
laboratory director or other
responsible person.]
(ii) Labels. (A) Warning labels shall
be affixed to containers of infectious
waste; refrigerators and freezers
containing blood and other potentially
infectious materials; and other
containers used to store or transport
blood or other potentially infectious
materials except as provided in
paragraph (gKl)(U) (E) and (F).
(B) Labels required by this section
shall include the following legend:
BIOHAZARO
[Name of the Infectious Agent]
[Special requirements for entering the
area)
(C) These labels shall be fluorescent
orange or orange-red or predominantly
so, with lettering or symbols in a
contrasting color.
(D) Labels required by paragraph
(g)(l)(ii) shall either be an Integral part
of the container or shall be affixed as
close as safely possible to the container
by string, wire, adhesive, or other
method that prevents their loss or
unintentional removal.
(E) Red bags or red containers may be
substituted for labels on containers of
infectious waste.
(F) Containers of blood or blood
components that are labeled as to their
contents and have been released for
distribution are exempted from the
labeling requirements of paragraph (g).
(2) Information and Training, (i)
Employers shall ensure that all
employees with occupational exposure
participate in a training program.
(ii) Training shall be provided at the
time ot initial employment or within 90
days after the effective date of this
standard and at least annually
thereafter.
(iii) Material appropriate in content
and vocabulary to educational level,
literacy, and language background of
employees shall be used.
(iv) The training program shall contain
the following elements:
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(A) A copy of this standard and an
explanation of its contents;
(B) A general explanation of the
epidemiology and symptoms of
bloodbome diseases;
(C) An explanation of the modes of
transmission of bloodbome pathogens;
(D) An explanation of the employer s
infection control program.
(E) An explanation of the appropriate
methods for recognizing tasks and other
activities that may involve exposure to
blood and other potentially infectious
materials;
(F) An explanation of the use and
limitations of practices that will prevent
or reduce exposure including
appropriate engineering controls, work
practices, and personal protective
equipment;
(G) Information on the types, proper
use, location, removal, handling,
decontamination and/or disposal of
personal protective equipment;
(H) An explanation of the basis for
selection of personal protective
equipment;
(I] Information on the hepatitis B
vaccine, including information on its
efficacy, safety, and the benefits of
being vaccinated.
(J) Information on the appropriate
actions to take and persons to contact in
an emergency;.
(K) An explanation of the procedure
to follow if an exposure incident occurs,
including the method of reporting the
incident and the medical follow-up that
will be made available. Also
information on the medical counseling
that the employer is providing for
exposed individuals; and
(L) An explanation of the signs and
labels and/or color coding required by
paragraph (g)(1).
(v) Additional training. Employees in
HIV or HBV research laboratories and
HIV or HBV production facilities shall
receive the following training in addition
to the above training requirements:
(A) Employees shall be trained in and
demonstrate proficiency in standard
microbiological practices and
techniques and in the practices and
operations specific to the facility before
being allowed to work with HIV or HBV.
(B) Employees shall be experienced in
the handling of human pathogens or
tissue cultures prior to working with
HIV or HBV.
(C) A training program shall be
provided to employees who have no
prior experience in handling human
pathogens. Initial work activities shall
not include the handling of infectious
agents. A progression of work activities
shall be assigned as techniques are
learned and proficiency is developed.
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The employee shall participate in work
tivities involving infectious agents
ly after proficiency has been
emonstrated.
(h) Recordkeeping—(1) Medical
rpcords. (i) The employer shall establish
and maintain an accurate record for
each employee subject to paragraph (f)
of this section, in accordance with 29
CFR 1910.20.
(ii) This record shall include:
(A) The name and social security
number of the employee;
(B) A copy of the employee's hepatitis
B vaccination records and medical
records relative to the employee's ability
to receive vaccination or the
circumstances of an exposure incident:
(C) A copy of all results of physical
examinations, medical testing, and
follow-up procedures as they relate to
the employee's ability to receive
vaccination or to post exposure
evaluation following an exposure
incident;
(D) The employer's copy of the
physician's written opinion; and
(E) A copy of the information
provided to the physician as required by
paragraphs (f)(4).
(iii) Confidentiality. The employer
shall assure that employee medical
records required by paragraph (f) are:
(A) Kept confidential; and
(B) Are not disclosed or reported to
any person within or outside the
workplace except as required by this
section or as may be required by law.
(iv) The employer shall maintain this
record for at least the duration of
employment plus 30 years in accordance
with 29 CFR 1910.20.
(2) Training Records, (i) Training
records shall include the following
information:
(A) The dates of the training sessions;
(B) The contents or a summary of the
training sessions;
(C) The names of persons conducting
the training; and
(D) The names of all persons
attending the training sessions.
(ii) These records shall be maintained
for 5 years.
(3) Availability, (i) The employer shall
assure that all records required to be
maintained by this section shall be
made available upon request to the
Assistant Secretary and the Director for
exanjination and copying.
(ii) Employee training records
required by this paragraph shall be
provided upon request for examination
and copying to employees, employee
representatives, and the Assistant
Secretary in accordance with 29 CFR
1910.20.
(iii) Employee medical and training
records required by this paragraph shall
be provided upon request for
examination and copying to the subject
employee, to anyone having written
consent of the subject employee, and to
the Assistant Secretary in accordance
with 29 CFR 1910.20.
(4) Transfer of records, [i] The
employer shall comply with the
requirements involving transfer of
records set forth in 29 CFR 1910.20(h).
(ii) If the employer ceases to do
t)usiness and there is no successor
employer to receive and retain the
records for the prescribed period, the
employer shall notify the Director, at
least three months prior to their dispusal
and transmit them to the Director if
required by the Director to do so within
that three month period.
(i) Dates—{!) Effective Date. The
standard shall become effective on
[Insert date 30 days after publication in
the Federal Register).
(2) Exposure Determination. The
exposure determination required by
paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall be
completed within 90 days of the
effective date of this standard.
.(3) Infection Control Plan. The
liifection Control Plan required by
paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall be
completed within 120 days of the
effective date of this standard.
(4) Paragraphs (d)(2) Engineering and
Work Practice Controls, (d)(3) Personal
Protective Equipment, (d)(4)
Housekeeping, (e) HIV and HBV
Research Laboratories and Production
Facilities, (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination
and Post-Exposure Follow-up. (g)
Communication of Hazards to
Employees, and (h) Recordkeeping shall
take effect 150 days after the effective
date of this standard. OSHA expects
that the employer will have initiated, but
perhaps not completed, the HBV
vaccination series within this time
period.
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BIOLOGICAL SAFETY AUDIT CHECKLIST
Departmeat:
Lab manager:
Div: Building: Room:
Phone/ext.
Type of facility: clinical/diagnostic laboratory (CDL); research laboratory
(RL); production facility (PF) ________
I.  ENTRY (For RL and PF only; for CDL, go to II)
1. Are Biohazard warning signs present on all
access doors to area?
2. Is name of infectious agent(s), name/phone
numbers (work & home) of personnel to contact
in case of emergency and special requirements
for entering the area present?
Contacts Ext. Phone
YES NO
Agents:
3. Are doors closed when work is ongoing?
4. If PF, is facility separated from areas which are
open to unrestricted traffic flow within the bldg.?
a. Is entry into facility made by passage through
two sets of doors?
b. Do access doors to area self close?
c. Is airflow directed into the work area when
the door is opened?
d. If access to facility is by means of an airlock,
is it functioning properly?
II. WORK AREA
1. LABORATORY EQUIPMENT/ITEMS
a. Are refrigerators/freezers where biohazards are
stored marked with appropriate labels?
b. Are incubators/baths for biohazards marked with
appropriate labels?
c. Is sink/soap/towels available for washing hands
and are hand washing facilities accessible?
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d. If PF, are sinks automatically operated and
near door?
e. Is disinfectant available on the counters for
surface decontamination and spill cleanup?
f. Are vacuum lines used with biohazards protected
with a disinfectant trap and filter? (.2um or HEPA)
g. If RL or PF, is centrifuge containment proper?
- sealed heads or safety cups minimum or
HEPA vented containment device
h. Proper syringe usage? (only needle-locking or
complete syringe-needle units to be used)
PERSONAL PROTECTION
a. Are laboratory coats, gowns, smocks present &/or
made readily available?
i.   are they worn and appropriate for procedure
observed? (wrap around disposable smocks
are mandatory for PF)
ii.  are they buttoned or fully fastened?
iii. are they removed before going to
non-lab areas?
• b. Is eye/face protection (including safety glasses,
masks and chin length face shields) present &/or
made readily available?
i.   is it worn and appropriate for procedure
observed? (eye protection mandatory for PF)
c. Are gloves present &/or made readily available?
i.   are they worn and appropriate for procedure
observed? (mandatory for PF)
ii.  are surgical/examination gloves replaced and
disposed of (not washed/disinfected & re-used)
as soon as visibly soiled, torn, or their ability
to function as a effective barrier
is compromised? __
For PF, in addition to above, are disposable shoe
coverings, face mask or respirator and hair
net worn?
3. HAZARDOUS WASTE: CONTAINMENT, REMOVAL, TRANSPORT
a. Container for needles/sharps present?
i.   proper type? (no needle-clipping types)
•t»i!'?apir-siWBr'r
ii.  properly labeled or color-coded red?
b. Container present for liquid disposal?
i.   properly labeled? (red containers may
be substituted for labels)
ii.  is container unbreakable?
iii. note kind and concentration of disinfectant
used; is it appropriate?
iv.  is container left to sit overnight and
changed daily?
c. Container(s) present for biohazardous solid
waste disposal?
i.   are they clean and disinfected regularly?
ii.  are they properly labeled? (red containers
may be substituted for labels)
iii. are proper autoclave bags used?
iv.  are bags reasonably filled? (approx. 2/3 full)
V.   are bags appropriately labeled or
color-coded red?
vi.  are bags appropriately sealed for transport?
vii. are liquids present with solid wastes?
(if yes, comment)
d. Are bags of waste placed in a second leakproof
container or bag which is appropriately
labeled or color-coded red during storage/
transport for decontamination?
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e. Is an autoclave close/present in building? __
ENGINEERING CONTROLS
a. General Ventilation (for PF only; CDL & RL go to 4.c.)
i.   Is a ducted, exhaust air ventilation
system provided? __
ii.. Is exhaust air from the work area directly
discharged to the outside (non recirculated)
away from intakes and occupied areas?
b. Facility Design (applies only to PF)
i.   Are walls, floors and ceiling of facility
water resistant?
ii.  Are all cracks, crevices, joints and
penetrations sealed to facilitate decon.
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c. Biosafety Cabinets/Clean Air Stations/Fume Hoods
i.   What type(s) of cabinets
are present? ______ ______
ii.  Asset #
iii. Date last certified?
iv.  Is this date current?
V.   Does hood indicate normal
operative conditions?
vi.  Is hood cluttered or objects
intake portals/vents?     _
vii. Is hood proper for type/
manipulation of agent?
viii.Is unit left "on" at
all times?
IX.
X.
XI.
Is alarm kept in the "on"
position?
Are work surfaces disinfected
after every use? ___
Is sash kept at required
levels?
III. LABORATORY TECHNIQUE /_WORK PRACTICECONTROLS
1. If RL or PF, are all potentially infectious
and known biohazardous materials used in a
biological safety cabinet?
2. If CDL, are personnel using techniques to minimize
aerosolization (splashing', spraying, spattering)
of potentially infectious materials?
a. If risk for aerosilization persists, is proper
,',        eye and mouth protection used &/or proper
physical containment devices?
3. Are food/drinks/cigarettes/cosmetics/contact lenses
used/stored in work environment? (food & drinks must
be stored in refrigerators designated only
for consumables)
4. Is laboratory clean/unclutterd?
5. Are surfaces cleaned and disinfected upon completion
of a procedure, at end of work shift, and immediately
after a spill of potentially infectious materials?
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6. Are paper toweling or "protective covering material"
(eg. plastic, aluminum foil, etc.) used on bench top
removed and discarded daily?
7. ͣ Are mechanical pipetting devices present? No mouth
pipetting allowed!
8. Is laundry that is overtly contaminated with potentially
infectious materials treated as contaminated, bagged at
location and not sorted or rinsed in patient care areas?
a. Is it placed and transported in bags that are
biohazard labeled or color-coded red?
i. are these bags leakproof?
9. Do laundry workers wear a minimum of protective
gloves when handling or sorting such laundry?
10.Are specimens of blood or other potentially infectious
materials placed in a closable, leakproof container
and labeled or color-coded appropriately prior to being
stored or transported?
a. If outside contamination of primary container is
likely to occur during storage/handling/transport,
is it placed in a durable, watertight secondary
container, that is puncture proof if necessary
and labeled or color-coded appropriately.?
11.Are reusable items decontaminated prior to washing
and/or reprocessing?
12.Are spills & accidents resulting in overt exposure to
employees reported to the lab. director/raananger?
IV. EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL PROGRAMS, POLICIES AND TRAINING
1. If RL or PF, do personnel have written Biosafety
policies, procedures, or manual to reference?
2. Have personnel at risk to an occupational exposure to
blood or other infectious materials been through the
appropriate Biosafety training?
a. Is it proper and in accordance with paragraphs
(g)(2) of standard?
b. Are training records kept and in accordance with
paragraphs (h)(2)(3) of standard?
3. Have personnel been offered or actively participate in
a Hepatitis B vaccination program if exposed to blood
or other potentially infectious materials one or
more times a month?
a. Is it proper and in accordance with paragraphs
(f)(1)(2)(4)(5) of standard?
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b. Are medical records kept of all employees
that qualify for program in accordance with
paragraphs {h)(l)(3) of standard?
Have personnel been offered or at one time have
participated in a post exposure evaluation and
follow-up program?
a. Is it proper and in accordance with paragraph
(f)(3) of standard?
b. Are medical records kept for exposed individuals
in accordance with paragraphs (h)(1)(3)
of standard?
Has an infection control plan been established to minimize
or eliminate employee exposure in accordance with paragraphs
(c)(1)(2) of standard? ___
Is there any training that the personnel would like to
receive that has not been offered?
Were there any comments made by personnel regarding
safety? (if yes, comment)
V. REMARKS:
Audit Performed By:______________     ͣ Date:
Audit Reviewed By: ________________________ Date:
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Eddie Schwartz
Dept. 9ZTR
Bldg. AP-20
Room #1000
June 28, 1990
Eddie Schwartz,
A biological safety audit of your laboratory was performed on
06/10/90.  In accordance with Corporate Safety and Loss Prevention
Policy No. 30.0, we noted some areas where biological safety is
potentially compromised.  The purpose of this letter is to bring such
areas to your attention and provide you with suggestions as to how
they may be corrected.  After reviewing the attached report, please
send us a letter by 08/02/90 stating the steps that were taken to
remedy the conditions noted as well as the dates they were
implemented.  Also for your review is a copy of the audit form used
to assess your laboratory. Letters and questions regarding the audit
should be directed to Dr. David Mulligan, Corporate Biological
Safety, Dept. 585, AP-6D, ext. 77043.
Sincerely,
David Mulligan
Manager Corporate
Biological Safety
Rick Mattick
auditor
Attachment
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Corporate Biological Safety Audit Report
- Improper use or no biohazard warning signs present on entry to area.
Your laboratory requires a biosafety level "2" sign on all doors
entering your laboratory and any preparation rooms, production rooms,
or inner laboratories where your biohazardous agents are
used/manipulated/stored.  These can be obtained through the sign shop
in North Chicago and are square 6"x 6" permanent plastic signs with
color designations of yellow, orange and red for Potential, BSL-2, and
BSL-3 level hazards respectively.  They may be ordered using
an interior signage request form. Contact the sign shop at ext. 76827.
Temporary paper biohazard signs to be used until the permanent signs
arrive can be obtained through Mary Cipriano, Manager of
ADD Biological Safety, D917, AP6C, ext. 72225 or Dave Mulligan,
Corporate Biological Safety, D585, AP6D, ext. 77043.
- For BSL-2 and 3 laboratories, included on the sign shall be the name
of the infectious agent(s) and name/phone numbers (work and home)
including area code, of at least two personnel to contact in case of
an emergency.  This list should appear in the form of a 3"x 9" sticker
which can attach directly to the plastic, permanent signs.
The stickers can be obtained through Mary Cipriano, Manager of ADD
Biosafety, D917, AP6C, ext. 72225.
- All refrigerators/freezers where biohazardous material is stored
should be appropriately marked with a label containing the universal
biohazard symbol. The contents of the refrigerator/freezer should also
appear on the label. Recommended are the red, 1" x 3" biohazard/hazard
identity stickers, stock #5560, or the orange, 1" x 3" Human Blood or
Tissues: Potential Biohazard stickers, stock #8910, if only blood or
tissues of unknown pathogenicity are stored.  Both can be obtained in
rolls of 1000 through the Scientific Stockrooms located in buildings
AP8B (70664), AP9 (75274) and RIB (76020).
- All incubators/baths for biohazardous materials should be marked
with a label containing the universal biohazard symbol.
Recommended are the red biohazard/hazard identity stickers attainable
as above.
- Disinfectant should be readily available.  Recommended for surface
decontamination is a 2% bleach solution (1000 ppm available chlorine).
Bleach is very effective in the decontamination of a wide spectrum of
microorganisms. For spill cleanup, a 20% bleach solution is
recommended (10,000 ppm available chlorine) for biohazardous materials
or a 2% gluteraldehyde solution when the biohazardous materials also
contain radioactivity. A bleach solution up to 20% (10,000 ppm
available chlorine) can be used on stainless steel surfaces, such as
those found in biosafety cabinets, as long as it is followed by a
Iwater rinse.
- If house vacximn lines are used to filter, draw, transfer
biohazardous liquids, the line must be protected with a disinfectant
trap composed of a flask containig a 20% bleach solution (10,000
ppm available chlorine) as well as a vacuum line filter.
"Vac-U-Shield" filters (Stock #8320) are available through the PPD
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Scientific Stockrooms located in buildings AP8B (70664), AP9 (75274)
and RIB (76020).
- It is required that latex or vinyl gloves be worn during any
laboratory procedure or technique where potential or known
biohazardous agents may come in contact with the skin due to the fact
that the skin of most individuals is not completely intact.
- A puncture resistant container for disposal of the entire
syringe/needle unit, or other contaminated sharp waste (eg. scalpels,
pasteur pipettes) should be present and labeled with a biohazard
sticker. Recommended containers are obtained through the PPD
Scientific Stockrooms in buildings AP8B, AP9, and RIB and through
ADD Manufacturing Supplies (Dept. 49K), located in buildings AP-8B and
AP-32.  There are three types available: an all purpose, 8 quart
sharps disposal container (stock #9865), a 8 quart syringe disposal
container which stacks complete syringe units to maximize capacity
(stock #9864), and a 14 quart pipette disposal container, for large
sharps disposal (stock #9866).
- Needle clipping disposal containers shall not be used. Recommended
are puncture resistant containers for disposal of complete
syringe/needle unit.
- All syringe/sharps containers should be labeled with a sticker
containing the universal biohazard symbol.
- A container must be present so that liquid biohazardous waste can be
decontaminated prior to disposal. The final disinfectant
concentration, (i.e. disinfectant and liquid waste mixture) should
contain:
- 10% bleach (5,000 ppm available chlorine) if mixture is
allowed to sit 12 hours before disposal down the drain.
- 20% bleach (10,000 ppm) if the mixture is allowed to sit
for at least 2 hours prior to disposal down the drain.
- 2% gluteraldehyde if radioactive biohazardous wastes are
used. This mixture does not go down the drain.
Rad/Bio waste containers can be purchased through the ADD warehouse,
on the AP8B dock or at AP32 when open. These containers are black
steel drums with small screw off caps and come in 5 gallon
(Stock # 76-0039) and 30 gallon ( stock #76-0067) capacities. You must
order with a finishing request form (FSR).  When full, contact
housekeeping for removal of container. If generating relatively small
amounts of bio wastes, like those generated from an IMX, TDX, excess
clinical samples, etc.. storage for decontamination is easiest in a
carboy, plastic bottle, or a similar, non-breakable container. All
liquid biohazard containers must be labeled with an appropriate
biohazard sticker.
- All biohazardous solid waste must be 2x bagged.
Autoclave bags for biowaste are available through the PPD Scientific
Stockrooms located in buildings AP8B, AP9, and RIB (stock #5544). They
are semi-opaque bags and when used with biohazard stickers for proper
identity are less expensive than the biowaste bags typically available
'from most lab supply vendors.
- All waste containers, bins and cans housing biohazardous waste
should remain clean at all times and be disinfected regularly.
- Laundry contaminated with biohazardous materials, blood or other
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potentially infectious materials shall be treated as contaminated,
bagged at the location where it was used, and decontaminated prior
to laundering.
- All laboratory personnel, including temporaries, must attend the
biohazard training course. See attached "Biosafety Training Schedule"
for dates and times.
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OUTLINE FOR BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGEN AUDIT SYSTEM
I. Goal:
a. To develop a computer based biological safety audit
system that can be used by safety professionals to evaluate
research, clinical and production laboratories for
compliance to the proposed Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) blood-borne pathogen standard plus
existing HIV/HBV guidelines.
b. To be able to use information collected on audit as a
means of classifying research, clinical, and production
laboratories as high, medium, or low risk with respect to
occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens and subsequent
infection.
II. System Structure:
The entire audit system will be comprised of three main
elements, the computer data base, the paper checklist,
and the fault tree analysis.
a. The database system selected will display the
following characteristics:
1. flexibility; to be used on IBM and IBM compatible
systems.
2. user friendly for easy incorporation by safety
professionals/industrial hygienists with minimal
computer skills.
3. low cost; allowing system to be attainable by both
small and large companies and institutions.
4. data management capabilities featuring the ability
to:
A. store audit data.
B. generate audit response reports noting
deficiencies
and providing remedial information.
C. manipulate audit data into informative graphs and
reports.
D. supply emergency response capabilities.
b. A portable, paper audit form will be used to review
laboratory on-site. The audit will assess the
following elements of biological safety:
1. Entry and Facility Design
A. Is the facility design adequate to contain the
agent and provide protection to human health
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both in the internal and external laboratory
environment?
B. Do external signs adequately identify and warn of
agents used in the laboratory and provide
emergency response information?
2. Laboratory Work Area
A. Laboratory Equipment/Items
i. Is lab equipment/accessories proper for use
with blood-borne pathogens and identified as
such?
B. Personal Protection
i. Is proper personal protection worn?
C. Biohazard Waste Management
i. Is solid and liquid biological waste properly
identified, stored, transferred, and disposed
of?
D. Engineering Controls
i. Is general ventilation proper for type of
facility?
ii. Are biosafety cabinets, clean air stations
and fume hoods appropriate for type of work,
used correctly, and certified?
3. Facility Practices and Habits
A. Are appropriate biological safety and laboratory
practice procedures followed?
4. Evaluation of Programs, Policy and Training
A. Are employees adequately trained for work in a
biological laboratory?
B. Are they informed on the present federal
regulations and guidelines as well as any
internal policies?
C. Are medical surveillance and hepatitis B
vaccination programs offered and do the employees
actively participate?
D. Do employees have any comments or concerns
regarding safety in their laboratory?
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The fault tree will be constructed and used in
conjunction with the on-site paper audit checklist to
classify facilities as either high, medium, or low
risk based on their potential ability to cause a
bloodborne pathogen exposure and subsequent
infection.  The fault tree will:
1. identify the potential pathways of exposure to
blood and other potentially infectious materials
2. classify these various exposure routes as high,
medium, or low risk with respect to their ability or
to cause infection
3. list the elements contained in the audit that
contribute to the risk of the specific exposures
noted in the exposure scheme.
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